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Currency mismatch—the extent to which an economy’s liabilities are denominated in foreign 
currency while its assets are denominated in domestic currency—is widespread in emerging 
Europe. While currency mismatch was an important aspect of the Mexico crisis in 1994 and the 
East Asian crisis in 1997-98, it reached unprecedented levels in Eastern Europe before the recent 
crisis.  
Currency mismatch has been a prime vehicle for agents to take on insolvency risk and has 
resulted in large exposures to systemic risk for the economy as a whole. However, currency 
mismatch is also an engine of credit growth that has allowed new and small firms to finance 
profitable investment projects. In this paper, we investigate this dual role of currency mismatch, 
focusing on the experience of emerging Europe in recent years. In particular, we investigate 
whether currency mismatch has been associated with faster economic growth, but also more 
severe crises.  
A key contribution of this paper is the construction of a currency mismatch index. Due to the 
lack of readily available data, there is a dearth of currency mismatch measures that capture the 
underlying undertaking of systemic risk. In this paper, we construct such an index and we 
analyze at the macroeconomic level the links between currency mismatch, economic growth, and 
the severity of the crises over the period 1998-2009, first in emerging Europe and then in a 
broader sample of emerging economies. Finally, we use firm-level to investigate whether taking 
on currency mismatch helps firms reduce interest costs, relax borrowing constraints and improve 
growth performance. 
Our currency mismatch measure focuses on the banking sector. If one looks exclusively into the 
banks' balance sheets, the notional degree of currency mismatch is often small, as the banks with 
foreign currency liabilities also tend to lend in foreign currency. However, there is de-facto 
currency mismatch if banks’ debtors cannot hedge their exchange rate risk—in the form of credit 
risk. Thus, in case of a large depreciation, a large share of domestic debtors could go bust, 
affecting the asset portfolio of the banks that lent to them and generating a risk of a systemic 
financial meltdown. An appropriate measure of currency mismatch needs to account for this 
source of systemic risk. To our knowledge, such an index is not available in the literature. The 
reason is a lack of readily available data on the composition of banks’ assets and liabilities and 
the extent to which borrowers in foreign currency are hedged. 
We construct such a de-facto currency mismatch index by combining information on foreign 
currency assets and liabilities of banks with BEEPS firm-level data and other data sources from 
national authorities and the IMF confidential vulnerability exercises. We measure the fraction of 
foreign currency loans granted to borrowers with no foreign currency income. Therefore, our de-
facto currency mismatch measure takes explicitly into account that part of banks’ foreign 
currency assets are foreign currency loans to unhedged borrowers. We exclude the latter from the 
asset side of the banks’ balance sheets in order to calculate a currency mismatch measure that 
adjusts for indirect foreign currency risk through credit risk. We construct such an index for 
10 emerging European economies for which such detailed data is available, over the period 
1998-2009. We then compute a similar de-facto currency mismatch index for a set of 19 more 
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emerging economies, for which somewhat less detailed data are available. Interestingly, we find 
that this de-facto measure is much larger than other currency mismatch measures that do not 
control for the banks’ borrowers’ ability to hedge.  
Using our currency mismatch measure, we find that there are statistically significant links 
between currency mismatch and economic growth, both across the set of 10 emerging European 
economies, as well as across the larger group of 29 emerging economies. A greater increase in 
currency mismatch is associated with faster economic growth during tranquil times, but also with 
a more severe crisis. However, even if we take into account the recent crisis, we still find a 
positive link between currency mismatch and growth. These results are robust to a number of 
tests and alternative specifications.  
To demonstrate the dual role of currency mismatch, we present a conceptual framework, in 
which contract enforceability problems generate borrowing constraints, as lenders require 
collateral to ensure that borrowers will repay their debt. As there is a—small—probability that 
the exchange rate might experience a severe depreciation and agents believe that there are bailout 
guarantees against systemic crises, it is optimal to borrow in foreign currency, even if it entails a 
(small) probability of bankruptcy. Borrowers find currency mismatch optimal because (i) the 
expected interest payments on Euro debt are much smaller than those on domestic currency debt; 
and (ii) they can borrow more. Risk premia on Euro debt do not fully reflect the extent of 
insolvency risk, because the government is expected to grant a bailout in the rare event of a 
severe financial crisis. In other words, systemic bailout guarantees generate an implicit subsidy 
that can be exploited only by taking on insolvency risk. This mechanism generates a positive link 
between economic growth and currency mismatch, as the latter helps relax borrowing 
constraints. However, it also implies more severe crises in countries with a more severe currency 
mismatch.  
At the firm level, the above arguments imply that firms that take on currency mismatch enjoy 
better borrowing conditions and grow faster outside crisis times, especially in sectors that tend to 
be financially constrained, such as small firms in the nontradable sector. In our empirical firm-
level analysis we investigate whether firms that take on currency mismatch enjoy these benefits. 
We use data for a large cross-section of European economies from the Business Environment 
and Enterprise Performance Survey of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(BEEPS). Our regression analysis finds that across financially constrained groups of firms, 
currency mismatch reduces the interest rate by 2 percentage points on average, and increases the 
average loan maturity by 10 months. Furthermore, firms with currency mismatch exhibit 
2.3 percentage points faster annual growth. Interestingly, these effects are not present across 
groups of large firms, which are usually far less likely to be financially constrained. 
Much of the literature on the impact of currency mismatch on firms’ performance uses stock 
market listed firms, and finds that balance sheet effects associated with currency mismatch have 
been a minor issue. However, the sample of listed firms is a biased sample of large privileged 
firms, which are not representative of the majority of firms in these countries. An advantage of 
our approach is that it considers both listed and non-listed firms, and so we are able to effectively 
capture the effects of currency mismatch across the entire economy, not just the prime listed 
firms.   Brown, Ongena and Yesin (2009) are the first to use a representative sample of firms in 
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Eastern Europe from the BEEPS survey to study foreign currency borrowing. Our work differs 
from theirs in two dimensions. First, we focus specifically on currency mismatch—i.e., on 
foreign currency borrowing by firms with no foreign currency income--rather than on foreign 
currency borrowing. Second, we mainly assess the impact of currency mismatch on the terms of 
borrowing and on firm performance rather than its determinants.  
One contribution of our paper is to offer both a macro and micro perspective on the effects of 
currency mismatch. The firm-level analysis  allows us to test wether our theoretical mechanism 
is operative at the firm level.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 describes the boom and bust experienced 
by emerging Europe during the last decade. Section 2 presents the conceptual framework. 
Section 3 describes how we construct our de facto currency mismatch index and analyzes the 
macroeconomic effects of currency mismatch. Section 4 presents the firm-level analysis. 
Section 5 presents a literature review. Section 6 presents the conclusions. Finally, the Appendix 
contains a simple model, a description of our empirical methodology and the data sources. 
1. The Boom and Bust Cycle in Emerging Europe 
Before the recent crisis, emerging Europe included some of the fastest growing emerging 
economies, growing at rates that in some cases were even higher than in emerging Asia, even 
after controlling for differences in initial per capita GDP (Figure 1.1). This growth performance 
was in part driven by EU-related reforms and expectations that euro adoption will follow EU 
membership. Indeed, most countries in the region either joined the EU or started membership 
negotiations, or at a minimum applied for membership during the last decade; Slovenia and the 
Slovak Republic have also introduced the euro as their currency (Table 1.1).1   
As part of the EU-driven reforms and the liberalization of these economies, capital controls and 
credit market regulations were dismantled in most countries—indeed, such reforms have 
progressed further in EU-member countries. The opening up of the economy combined with 
privatization in the financial sector led to a boom in foreign bank ownership throughout 
emerging Europe. The share of foreign banks in total bank assets ranges from 29 percent in 
Slovenia to 99 percent in Estonia, with an average of 77 percent and a median of 84 percent 
(Figure 1.2). Financial openness, measured as foreign assets plus foreign liabilities over GDP, 
increased substantially (Figure 1.3). Structural reforms, the opening of the capital account, 
financial liberalization and the domination of foreign banks with easy access to financing from 
their parent banks were the main ingredients of the economic boom in emerging Europe during 
the pre-crisis period.  
Borrowing costs fell sharply throughout the region during the precrisis period, particularly in 
foreign currency. Lending interest rates in foreign currency adjusted for expected depreciation 
                                                            
1 The road to the EU includes a large number of deep economic, legal, and institutional reforms to comply with the 
EU acquis, including the opening of the capital account. 
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were lower than interest rates in domestic currency by an average of 2½ percentage points during 
2004-2007 (Figure 1.4)—Hungary was the only exception. This interest rate differential was a 
key driver of currency mismatch and the large capital inflows intermediated by the banks. In 
fact, private credit expanded in emerging Europe faster than in other emerging economies, 
leading to faster growth, particularly in nontradables sectors (Figure 1.5 and Figure 1.6).2  
The boom led to the buildup of large external imbalances before the crisis, with high current 
account deficits and external debt levels (Figure 1.7 and Figure 1.8). Associated with the lending 
boom, real exchange rates appreciated in most countries in the region, regardless of exchange 
rate regime (Figure 1.9).   
Emerging Europe’s boom was driven by the private sector, not by government spending. The 
private sector saving-investment balances clearly dominated the current account balances 
(Figure 1.10). Moreover, private sector investment increased by 3.1 percentage points of GDP on 
average in the region between 2004 and 2007. In contrast, public sector investment increased by 
1 percentage point of GDP. Private sector savings fell by an average of 2.1 percentage points of 
GDP, while public savings actually increased, by an average of 1.8 percentage points of GDP 
during the same period. Most emerging European economies had small general government 
deficits and some had surpluses before the crisis. Moreover, the fiscal balances improved in 
almost all the economies in the region in the years leading to the crisis. General government debt 
levels were small throughout emerging Europe, with the exception of Hungary. Also, compared 
with other emerging economies, the government deficit and debt levels in emerging Europe 
before the recent crisis do not stand out, while the share of public sector external debt to total 
external debt—excluding short-term debt for which sector data are not available—was relatively 
low and declined even further before the crisis in most countries of the region (Figure 1.11 and 
Table 1.2). 
External imbalances were smaller in economies that started with a more developed financial 
sector and were more advanced in terms of institutional reforms. For example, current account 
deficits and external debt levels were substantially smaller in the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic. In the last two, lending interest rates converged to euro area 
levels as these countries introduced the euro—eliminating previous differentials between 
borrowing in domestic and in foreign currency. Also, these economies had relatively higher per 
capita GDP levels than most other economies in the region.  
Emerging Europe was hit by the crisis considerably more than other emerging economies. Real 
GDP growth turned sharply negative in 2009 and was substantially below what has been 
observed in other emerging economies (Figure 1.12). Borrowing costs increased sharply in all 
economies in the region, although from historically low levels (Figure 1.13).  
                                                            
2 The nontradable sector includes nonmanufacturing industry plus services, as defined by the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. The results are robust if we only include services.  
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Although there was no explicit systemic bailout guarantee in emerging Europe before the recent 
crisis, multilateral and bilateral external financing during the crisis effectively provided such 
guarantee. Eight countries in the region introduced IMF programs, which, as data from IMF staff 
reports show (Table 1.3), in addition to IMF financing, in most cases included funds from the 
EU, the World Bank, and bilateral sources (mostly from advanced European economies with 
bank sector exposures to emerging Europe). Moreover, the IMF programs included specific 
assumptions on foreign bank rollover rates, which were often negotiated and agreed between the 
respective banks and the authorities of the host advanced economies. Although such financing 
does not necessarily prove that there was an implicit systemic bailout guarantee, it has been large 
enough to effectively bailout both lenders and borrowers in emerging Europe. In many cases the 
bailout was granted indirectly via the support of exchange rate pegs. The collapse of the pegs, 
primarily in the Baltics, would have led to large losses due to balance sheet effects and cross-
border spillovers. 
2. Theoretical Mechanism 
This section presents an explanation of why taking on currency mismatch and the implied 
insolvency risk might be optimal from the perspective of both lenders and borrowers. The 
section then analyzes the macroeconomic implications of such decisions in terms of higher 
economic growth, but also systemic risk. The appendix presents a model that formalizes the 
mechanism. 
Currency mismatch arises when domestically oriented firms and households denominate their 
debt in foreign currency—for example Euros—while the cash flows that will service that debt 
are denominated in domestic currency. Consider a setup in which agents can denominate their 
debt in either domestic or foreign currency. To capture borrowing constrains that prevail in 
emerging economies, we assume that there are contract enforceability problems in credit 
markets. Lack of enforceability implies that borrowers cannot commit to repay their debt and 
might have incentives to divert funds. Lenders then impose borrowing constrains to ensure that 
they will be repaid.  
In such an environment, domestically oriented borrowers have no incentives to take on currency 
mismatch, as they will have to internalize the insolvency risk premium via higher interest rates 
and lower leverage. This environment, however, is not a complete description of the real world: 
we also need to consider the existence of bailout guarantees against systemic crises. It is a 
stylized fact that if a critical mass of borrowers is on the brink of bankruptcy, governments 
typically implement policies to ensure that creditors get repaid—at least in part—and avoid a 
systemic economic meltdown. In other words, governments insure creditors against systemic 
crises. These bailouts may come in the form of handing out checks, an easing of monetary 
policy, or the maintenance of an exchange rate peg.3 Notice that in this environment, if an 
isolated borrower were to default, the lender would not be bailed out. It is therefore necessary 
that a critical mass of defaults takes place. 
                                                            
3 Indeed, bailouts in emerging Europe during the recent crisis often took the form of supporting the pegs.  
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In the presence of guarantees, a domestically oriented firm will find it optimal to take on 
currency mismatch if two conditions hold: (i) there is a—small—probability of a severe real 
exchange rate depreciation; and (ii) it expects that a critical mass of borrowers also take on 
currency mismatch, so that the government will indeed grant a bailout in case of a severe real 
depreciation. From the lenders’ perspective, the bailout guarantee means that they will be repaid 
both under no depreciation and under depreciation. In the first case, the borrowers will repay, as 
their debt contract is incentive compatible. In the second case, the government will repay lenders 
via a bailout. The key implication is that the interest rate that the lenders charge does not include 
a premium for the insolvency risk that currency mismatch entails. It follows that from a 
borrower’s perspective, the expected interest costs are smaller for debt denominated in foreign 
currency than for debt denominated in domestic currency: it is actuarially cheaper to borrow in 
Euros than in domestic currency. 
The lower expected interest payments generate an additional advantage of currency mismatch: it 
relaxes the borrowing constraint. This is because the reduction in the expected debt service 
makes it less attractive for borrowers to divert funds instead of repaying debt. That is, currency 
mismatch relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint imposed by lenders in order to ensure 
that they will be repaid. It follows that if the likelihood of a sharp depreciation is small, a 
borrower finds it profitable to take on debt that will be repaid in Euros rather than debt that will 
be repaid in domestic currency, given that a critical mass of other borrowers are doing the same. 
The discussion in section 1 suggested that this key driver of currency mismatch was present in 
emerging Europe. Indeed, the differential between the interest rate on domestic currency 
denominated debt minus that on Euro denominated debt was greater than the expected 
depreciation of the domestic currency (Figure 1.4).    
Turning to the macroeconomic implications, there is a safe equilibrium, where no agent expects a 
bailout and, therefore, no domestically oriented borrower denominates debt in Euros. In such 
equilibrium, a severe depreciation will not generate generalized bankruptcies due to balance 
sheet effects. As a result, no borrower has incentives to take on currency mismatch and there will 
be neither a financial crisis, nor political pressures to grant a bailout in case of an isolated 
default. 
However, if a majority of agents believe that there are systemic bailout guarantees, there is also a 
risky equilibrium, where domestically oriented borrowers have incentives to denominate their 
debt in foreign currency, as: (i) they can borrow more funds; and (ii) the expected interest costs 
are lower. Lenders do not "charge" borrowers for the insolvency risk they take, as they know that 
the taxpayer will repay the debt in case of a systemic crisis. In other words, systemic bailout 
guarantees generate an implicit subsidy that can be cashed in only by taking on insolvency risk.  
If many constrained agents borrow in foreign currency, borrowing constraints are relaxed. Such 
increase in leverage will permit higher aggregate investment and consumption, which in turn will 
lead to faster economic growth during no-crisis times, provided constrained agents have 
profitable investment opportunities. The other side of the coin is that systemic risk develops in an 
economy with currency mismatch. This is because a large real depreciation could lead to 
generalized bankruptcies, especially of domestically oriented borrowers with Euro-debt in their 
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books. Hence, currency mismatch leads to faster growth, but also increases the likelihood of a 
financial crisis.  
Will average economic growth in an economy with currency mismatch be greater than in a safe 
economy, even after we take into account the occurrence of occasional financial crises? The 
answer hinges on the frequency of crises during the sample period and on the severity of crisis 
costs. This is an empirical issue, which this paper addresses. The empirical part of the paper 
focuses on two areas. First, it investigates the macroeconomic effects of currency mismatch 
implied by the theoretical mechanism—which we have sketched here (the model is discussed in 
the Appendix). Second, it uses firm-level data to investigate whether the channels through which 















Determinants and Effects of Currency Mismatch 
Microeconomic mechanism 
Two credit market imperfections: 
• Contract enforceability problems  Æ borrowing constraints 
• Systemic Bailout Guarantees   Æ incentives to take on risk 
Debt Denomination 
• domestic currency  Æ high interest rate & low leverage 
• foreign currency  Æ low interest rate & high leverage 
Macroeconomic Effects 
Severe borrowing constraints  Æ bottlenecks that impede faster growth. 
 
Currency mismatch   Ærelaxes borrowing constraints 
Æhigher investment 
Æhigher economic growth in no-crisis times 
 
Currency mismatch     Ægenerates systemic risk 
Æhigher likelihood of a financial crisis 
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3.  Aggregate  Currency  Mismatch:  Measurement  and  Macroeconomic 
Consequences. 
 Measuring Aggregate Currency Mismatch. 
This section presents a new currency mismatch measure that captures the existence of systemic 
risk by looking at the degree to which different agents hedge their foreign currency liabilities. 
We compute this index over the period 1998-2009 for 10 countries in emerging Europe. In the 
next section we extend the sample to include non European emerging economies, increasing the 
sample to a total of 29 emerging economies.  
There are different ways in which one can measure the degree of currency mismatch.4 A 
straightforward way is to compare the net national debt or debt service requirements to the net 
exports of a country. Another, also straightforward, way is to look at the ratio of foreign currency 
denominated liabilities to foreign currency denominated assets of the banking sector. These 
measures have the virtue of being simple and using readily available data. However, they might 
miss instances in which systemic risk is developing.  
The first measure does not capture mismatches at the sectoral level. Therefore, even if according 
to such an index, an economy does not have a currency mismatch, specific sectors could be 
exposed to foreign exchange risk, which could have systemic implications. Moreover, the 
presence of a vibrant export sector does not imply that a government would be able to tax 
exporters during a crisis in order to bailout debtors with foreign currency exposures. 
The second measure, by looking exclusively at bank balance sheets, will often find that the 
notional degree of currency mismatch is small, as banks with foreign currency liabilities also 
tend to lend in foreign currency—often because of prudential requirements. However, if 
domestic bank debtors cannot effectively hedge their exchange rate risk, banks are indirectly 
exposed to exchange rate risk, through credit risk. Thus, there is a de-facto systemic risk, which 
is not reflected in a notional currency mismatch measure that considers only banks’ balance 
sheets.  
The recent experience of the emerging European economies illustrates the deficiencies of the 
available currency mismatch measures. During the pre-crisis boom, banks in emerging Europe 
borrowed in foreign currencies—mostly in Euros, but also in U.S. dollars, Swiss Francs and, less 
so, in Yen—to extend loans denominated in foreign currencies both to the corporate sector and to 
households. Indeed, the share of foreign currency lending to total lending reached well above 
50 percent in most emerging European economies in 2007, which was substantially above shares 
in other emerging economies (see Figure 3.1). However, if a substantial share of this credit was 
extended to sectors with no foreign currency revenues and financed consumption and investment 
                                                            
4 For a discussion of the literature and measures of currency mismatch see Eichengreen, Hausmann and Pannizza 
(2007)  and Goldstein and Turner (2004). 
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in nontradables goods, the de-facto insolvency risk taken on by banks would be substantial and 
would have contributed to aggregate systemic risk. 
A currency mismatch index that appropriately captures the evolution of systemic risk should 
therefore control for indirect channels by which foreign currency debt can generate insolvencies 
across different classes of bank’s debtors. In other words, such an index should control for the 
sources of foreign currency income for different classes of foreign currency borrowers.  
This is one of the key contributions of this paper. We construct a de-facto currency mismatch 
index that covers the period 1998-2009. This index is computed as the ratio of foreign currency 
denominated net unhedged liabilities to total bank assets, where the former is determined by the 
share of banks’ net foreign currency liabilities that is lent to unhedged borrowers (see Box and 
Appendix for details). 
 
A new measure of currency mismatch 
Currency mismatch in the banking sector is usually measured as the difference between 
foreign currency assets and liabilities, both with respect to residents and non residents. 
However, to the extent that some of the foreign currency assets are claims towards 
unhedged borrowers, banks can be exposed to exchange rate risks indirectly, through 
credit risk. Bank balance sheet data will not capture such a risk. Indeed, although banks in 
emerging Europe are not directly exposed to exchange rate risks, as their foreign currency 
assets and liabilities are often matched by prudential regulations, they are exposed to 
indirect exchange rate risks through credit exposures to unhedged borrowers. Such indirect 
exposures explain to a large extent the substantial financial support provided by the EU 
during the recent crisis to save the pegged regimes in the region.  
The new measure that we are proposing in this paper adjusts the standard currency 
mismatch measure in the banking sector by indirect exchange risk through credit risk. We 
do so by constructing a measure of foreign currency lending that is not hedged, using a 
number of data sources (see appendix for details).  
The formula of the proposed currency mismatch measure is the following: 
Foreign currency denominated net unhedged liabilities / total bank assets  
= 




 [ foreign currency foreign assets +foreign currency domestic assets] 
+ 
[foreign currency lending to unhedged households + foreign currency lending to unhedged 
nonfinancial firms]}  
/  
[total bank assets] 
The adjustment includes foreign currency lending to unhedged households and to 
unhedged nonfinancial firms. As such lending is subject to exchange rate risk through 
balance sheet effects in households and nonfinancial firms, a sharp exchange rate 
depreciation would turn a large share of such loans to nonperforming loans. Therefore, a 
currency mismatch of a bank’s borrower will lead to a currency mismatch for the bank if 
the borrower cannot repay the loan during a crisis. Therefore, foreign currency loans to 
unhedged borrowers should be subtracted from the asset side of the banking sector in order 
to calculate a currency mismatch measure that will be valid during a crisis—which is 
exactly when the information provided by a currency mismatch measure becomes the most 
relevant. 
This measure of currency mismatch assumes that foreign currency lending to nonfinancial 
corporates and to households that have no foreign currency income is subject to exchange rate 
risk. In contrast, it assumes that exporters hedge all exchange rate risk, and so to them foreign 
currency loans are not part of the banks’ unhedged assets. However, it should be noted that even 
loans to borrowers with foreign currency income may not be serviced during a crisis if their 
foreign income declines, for example, due to a drop in exports as foreign demand drops sharply.5  
The construction of such an index requires refined data about bank balance sheets that permits 
tracking the evolution of credit to different sectors, including nonfinancial firms and households, 
and measuring the extent to which the debtors are hedged for exchange rate risk. Such data is not 
readily available, which might explain the lack of such de facto currency mismatch measures in 
the literature.  
We construct the currency mismatch measure by using data from a large number of sources, 
some of which are confidential IMF data. Data on foreign currency domestic and foreign asset 
and liabilities by sector and data on total bank assets are from Haver Analytics and from the 
internal and confidential IMF Vulnerability Exercise for Emerging Economies. The share of 
foreign currency lending to corporates with no foreign currency income comes from a number of 
sources, including various EBRD and World Bank firm survey data, country authority data, and 
various country studies. We have assumed that the share of households that are not hedged is 
                                                            
5 Indeed, the IMF’s WEO (October 2009) estimates that emerging Europe’s exports of goods and services fell by 13 
percent in volumes, or 24 percent in nominal US dollars, in 2009. 
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equal to the share of firms that are not hedged (where, arguably, the households are employed). 
However, we also discuss results when households do not hedge exchange rate risk at all. The 
Appendix contains the details on data sources, assumptions and robustness tests. 
Figure 3.2 shows the de-facto currency mismatch in all emerging European economies with 
available data during 1998-2009.6 The sample includes 10 countries that account for 86 percent 
of East Europe’s GDP, excluding Russia. The estimates show that currency mismatches 
increased throughout emerging Europe during the boom years before the recent crisis, 
particularly in Bulgaria, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. On average, currency mismatches as a 
share of bank assets increased by 16 percentage points during the last ten years in the region. 
Before the crisis, the currency mismatch index reached the highest level in Romania, Estonia, 
Croatia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The only economies without currency mismatches before the 
crisis (a negative index in 2007) included the Czech Republic and, less so, Ukraine.7 
To assess the importance of controlling for foreign currency lending to unhedged borrowers, 
Figure 3.3 shows an unadjusted notional currency mismatch (foreign currency denominated net 
liabilities without adjusting for foreign currency lending to unhedged borrowers) next to our de-
facto adjusted measure. The comparison shows that while most countries do not exhibit currency 
mismatch according to the unadjusted measure, they exhibit very large mismatches when we 
adjust for unhedged foreign currency lending. The difference is on average equal to 
23 percentage points, and is particularly sharp in Estonia, Latvia, and Bulgaria.  
Did unhedged lending go mostly to households or to the corporate sector? Table 3.1 shows the 
calculated currency mismatches for 2004 and 2007, without adjusting for unhedged foreign 
currency borrowing (first column), adjusting only for unhedged borrowing by households 
(second column), adjusting only for unhedged borrowing by firms (third column), and fully 
adjusting for unhedged borrowing (fourth column). A comparison of unadjusted and fully 
adjusted for unhedged foreign currency borrowing currency mismatches in 2004 and in 2007 
shows that currency mismatches increased in most countries during this period, in most cases 
substantially. A comparison of the second and third columns, which compares the extent to 
which the adjustment for unhedged foreign currency borrowing is due to household vs. firms, 
shows that most of the unhedged borrowing during the precrisis period was done by firms.  
However, unhedged foreign currency borrowing by household increased substantially by 2007—
which in some cases may reflect the mortgage-financed housing boom in some of the countries 
in the region. 
In many countries, firms took on additional insolvency risk via direct foreign currency 
borrowing from abroad, particularly in response to central bank measures to limit currency 
                                                            
6 See below for estimates for non-European emerging economies. 
7 Although Ukraine was overheating before the global financial crisis and eventually had a severe crisis and an IMF 




mismatch in the domestic banking sector.8 Although we do not include such direct borrowing in 
our baseline currency mismatch index, the last column in Table 3.1 contains currency mismatch 
estimates that include direct foreign currency borrowing from abroad.9 The estimates suggest 
that such borrowing increased currency mismatch in all countries in the sample before the 
crisis.10   
Table 3.2 compares our currency mismatch measure with two standard measures in the literature. 
The first is net external debt to exports of goods and services—net debt is defined as total 
external debt minus foreign assets of the central bank and the banking sector. The second is 
external debt service to exports of goods and services. The denominator of these ratios could also 
be net exports, but with most emerging European economies having negative net exports, this 
will make the interpretation of the changes in these ratios difficult. 
These comparisons suggest that our measure of currency mismatch provides new information. 
Although the share of net external debt to exports seems to be highly correlated with our 
measure, the correlation of the changes is very small. The share of external debt service to 
exports is even less correlated with our measures, both in terms of levels and changes. 
The Boom‐bust Cycle and Currency Mismatch in Emerging Europe  
This section analyzes the macroeconomic effects of the increase in currency mismatch. As 
Figure 3.4 shows, during the boom years, a higher increase in currency mismatch was associated 
with faster real GDP growth and faster credit growth. As the theoretical framework suggests, the 
increasing credit-to-GDP ratio can be explained by the faster growth of the nontradables sector 
relative to the tradable sector, with the former benefiting proportionally more from the relaxation 
of borrowing constraints. The sharp increase in the current account deficit and the accumulation 
of external debt were a by-product of the increasing nontradables-to-tradables output ratio. 
Indeed, Figure 3.5 shows that the production of nontradables relatively to tradables during the 
boom years in emerging Europe was highly correlated with the increase in currency mismatch. 
                                                            
8 Direct borrowing from abroad by corporates was often accompanied by a repayment guarantee by the domestic 
foreign owned bank to the parent bank abroad. Therefore, the exchange rate risk was still assumed by the domestic 
banking sector, while the loan was repaid to the parent bank. 
9 Based on data in Rosenberg and Tirpak (2009); see Appendix for details. 
10  Interestingly, currency mismatch resulting from direct borrowing from abroad seems to be higher in countries 
that introduced prudential measures in the domestic banking sector during the boom years. These measures included 
marginal reserve requirements and higher capital requirements intended to slow the overheating pressures and the 
buildup of external imbalances. Although this issue goes beyond the scope of this paper, such measures seem to 
have “pushed” foreign currency borrowing abroad. Indeed, the simple correlation between the number of macro-
prudential measures and the increase in foreign currency borrowing from abroad in emerging European economies 
during 2004-2007 is 0.5. See Hilbers, Ötker, Pazarbasioglu, and Johnsen (2005) for a detailed discussion of such 
measures by country. 
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During the crisis, these patterns reversed. As Figure 3.4 shows, the greater the increase in 
currency mismatch during the boom, the sharper the current account reversal and the steeper the 
fall in GDP during the crisis (no data is available yet for the nontradables-to-tradables output 
ratio during the crisis).  
A simple panel regression confirms the link between currency mismatch and emerging Europe’s 
recent boom and bust cycle. Table 3.3 shows the estimates of a panel regression of annual real 
GDP growth on the current and lagged changes in currency mismatch, a crisis dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 in 2009 (the year when growth turned negative in East Europe), 
interaction terms of the crisis dummy with the current and lagged changes of currency mismatch, 
the change in the ratio of external debt to GDP and a time trend. The first two columns present 
estimates with random effects, while the last two columns present estimates with fixed effects. 
However, both the likelihood ratio test and the Hausman test support the specification with 
random effects, which is therefore our preferred specification. The regression is estimated for the 
10 countries in emerging Europe in our sample, over the period 1998-2009.11  
All specifications in Table 3.3 suggest that changes in currency mismatch are positively 
correlated with growth in the precrisis period, but negatively correlated with growth during the 
crisis. The estimate of the currency mismatch is positive and statistically significant (although at 
the 10 percent level in the specification with fixed effects). The lagged currency mismatch is not 
statistically significant in these specifications (it is significant when the current value is not 
included, see below). The crisis dummy variable is negative and statistically significant in all 
specifications. With the exception of the specification with fixed effects, the interaction term of 
the lagged change in currency mismatch with the crisis dummy variable is negative and 
statistically significant. The latter suggests that countries in emerging Europe that increased their 
currency mismatch before the crisis were affected by the crisis more. The insignificant estimate 
of the interaction term with the current value of currency mismatch could be explained by the 
fact that some countries were forced to reduce their currency mismatch during the crisis. 
These results hold even when we control for the change in the external debt-to-GDP ratio, which 
actually does not turn out to be statistically significant. This suggests that it was not the increase 
in external debt that drove fast growth in emerging Europe before the crisis and the collapse of 
growth during the crisis, but the increase in currency mismatch. Therefore, an emerging 
European economy that increased its external debt without increasing its currency mismatch in 
relative terms during the last decade, did not experienced the same boom-bust cycle that took 
place in the rest of the region.  
Moreover, the economic significance of the estimates is sizable. According to the second 
regression, if the change in the currency mismatch increases by 6.6 percentage points (which is 
one standard deviation of the change in our index), growth increases by 0.8 percent during the 
precrisis period. The crisis dummy enters negatively and is statistically significant at the 
1 percent level. The point estimate indicates that growth across emerging Europe dropped by 
13.4 percent on average in 2009, keeping everything else in the regression constant. The point 
estimate of the interaction term of the crisis dummy with the lagged currency mismatch indicates 
                                                            
11  The results are robust if per capita real GDP, or PPP-adjusted per capita real GDP is used instead. 
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that a country that increased its currency mismatch by 6.6 percentage points the year before the 
crisis experienced a 5.5 percent more severe downturn during the crisis, compared with a country 
that did not increase its currency mismatch.  
Finally, the results suggest that countries in emerging Europe that increased their currency 
mismatch grew faster, even after taking into account the recent crisis. The baseline estimates in 
the second regression imply that a country that was increasing its currency mismatch by 6.6 
percentage points each year in the sample period (which, again, is one standard deviation of the 
change in our index), would have had a 4 percent higher GDP at the end of the period (including 
the crisis year) than a country that did not experience a currency mismatch increase. Taking the 
case of Estonia as an example, our estimates suggest that its GDP in 2009 was higher by 
3.3 percentage points, compared with what it would have been if Estonia had not increased its 
currency mismatch during the last decade. Moreover, this effect could be higher if one was able 
to include the recovery years. 
Focusing on our preferred specification with random effects, Table 3.4 presents results from a 
number of robustness tests:  
• We include additional controls: a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a country is 
or became an EU member; and the change in the ratio of nontradable production to GDP, in 
which case the period is limited to 1998-2007, as data are not available for more recent 
years—therefore, these specifications do not include the crisis dummy.  
 
• To partly address causality concerns, some specifications include only the lagged change of 
currency mismatch.  
 
• We recalculate the measure of currency mismatch assuming that households are no able to 
hedged currency risk at all—our currency mismatch measure above had assumed that 
households can hedge to the same extent that firms can hedge.  
 
• We divide currency mismatch by GDP instead of total bank assets.  
The results are confirmed by all these specifications. The change in currency mismatch, in either 
its current value or its first lag (when the current value is not included), has estimates that are 
positive and statistically significant in all specifications. However, the interaction of lagged 
currency mismatch with the crisis dummy variable is negative and statistically significant—the 
interaction of the current value of currency mismatch with the crisis dummy is not always 
statistically significant, most likely because some countries were forced to reduce their currency 
mismatch during the crisis. Therefore, the estimates show that periods with increasing currency 
mismatches are associated with faster growth, unless there is a crisis.12  
                                                            
12 The results are robust to the inclusion of currency mismatch measures that include direct foreign currency from 
abroad. However, this specification does not include a crisis dummy, as data for such borrowing are not available 
after 2007. These results are available upon request. 
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The interaction of the change in currency mismatch with the change in the ratio of nontradables 
to GDP in the last two regressions is positive and statistically significant (at least at the 10 
percent level), suggesting that one of the possible channels through which currency mismatch 
helped growth in the precrisis period was by financing the nontradable sector. EU membership 
also seems to be positively correlated with growth, with statistically significant estimates in most 
specifications, while the time trend does not have a statistically significant estimate. 
 
Currency mismatch and the recent boom and bust cycle in emerging economies 
This section expands the country sample to include non-European emerging economies, as well 
as additional European emerging economies for which we do not have the same level of data 
detail as for the 10 Eastern European countries we considered above. We then discuss some 
cross-country comparisons and estimate the above panel, annual growth regression, for the 
expanded sample of emerging economies, for the period 1998-2009. We then take advantage of 
the larger sample in order to estimate a cross-country growth regression, using averages over the 
period 2000-2009 and controlling for other growth determinants, as found in the literature.  
It is challenging to compute the currency mismatch for non European emerging economies, 
because of the lack of detailed data on domestic banks’ foreign currency loans to residents and 
foreign currency deposits of residents. The exceptional magnitude of foreign currency borrowing 
across sectors before the recent crisis has fostered a data collection effort in Eastern Europe that 
seems unparalleled in the rest of the emerging world, despite the role of currency mismatch in 
the financial crises of the 1990s. We were nevertheless able to extend our de-facto currency 
mismatch index to 19 additional countries (see Appendix for more details).  
We first get data on foreign currency loans to residents and foreign currency deposits of residents 
from the internal and confidential IMF Vulnerability Exercise for Emerging Economies, which is 
based on data provided by country authorities. Some gaps in the data on foreign currency 
deposits of residents are complemented by using data in Arteta (2003 and 2005) and in Haver 
Analytics. 
We then obtain data on banks’ foreign assets and liabilities. We use a data set constructed by Prat 
(2007) for: Argentina, Brazil, China, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Thailand, 
Turkey, and Uruguay. And we use data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
for: Bosnia & Herzegovina, Costa Rica, Egypt, Guatemala, Kazakhstan, Serbia, Venezuela, and 
Vietnam. Unfortunately, the IFS data on bank foreign assets and liabilities do not specify 
currency denomination. Thus, for these 8 countries we have assumed that all the banks’ foreign 
assets and liabilities are denominated in foreign currency.  
Finally, for the share of unhedged foreign currency borrowing, we use various sources. For Latin 
America, the share is based on firm survey data in Kamil (2004 and 2009). For other regions, we 
use various World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys, and set the share of unhedged foreign currency 
borrowing equal to the share of non-exporting firms with foreign currency loans to the total 
number of firms with foreign currency loans. We then assume that the share of foreign currency 
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loans that are fully hedged equals the tradables share, and the share of fully unhedged loans 
equals the nontradables share. As in the previous section, we assume that the share of unhedged 
borrowing is the same for households and firms.  
In order to assess whether the currency mismatch measure using IFS data on bank foreign assets 
and liabilities captures systemic risk in a similar way as the measure based on more detailed data, 
we compare the currency mismatch generated by them with our baseline currency mismatch 
measure for the 10 emerging European economies of the previous section. The simple correlation 
of the changes in the two currency mismatch measures is 0.85, suggesting that using IFS data is a 
reasonable approximation.13 
In the extended set of 29 countries, emerging Europe stands out as the region with the sharpest 
increase in currency mismatch. As Figure 3.6 shows, the six economies with the largest increase 
in currency mismatch are in this region: Estonia, Latvia, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Lithuania, and 
Serbia.14 
The increase in currency mismatch seems to be linked with financial deepening. As noted above, 
private sector credit as a share of GDP increased substantially in emerging Europe during the last 
decade. Figure 3.7 exhibits a strong positive correlation between the increase in the private sector 
credit-to-GDP ratio and the increase in currency mismatch. 
The results in Table 3.5 confirm the links between currency mismatch and growth during the 
recent boom and bust cycle in emerging economies. Although we present specifications with 
random and fixed effects, the preferred specification is again with random effects, based on both 
the likelihood ratio and the Hausman tests.  
The change in currency mismatch enters positively and is statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level in all specifications. The estimates are somewhat smaller than for the whole sample, but 
still economically significant. Emerging economies that were increasing their currency mismatch 
during the precrisis period were also growing faster. However, and as found for emerging Europe 
above, these economies were hit the most by the recent crisis, as suggested by the negative and 
statistically significant estimate of the interaction term of the lagged change in currency 
mismatch with the crisis dummy variable—as for the sample for emerging Europe, the 
interaction term of the current value of currency mismatch with the crisis dummy is not always 
significant, as some countries were forced to reduce their currency mismatch during the crisis. 
As for the European sample, these results hold even when we control for the change in the 
external debt-to-GDP ratio.15  
                                                            
13 The results for emerging Europe in Table 4.3 are robust if we use the currency mismatch index with IFS net 
foreign assets data instead of data from Haver Analytics. These results are available from the authors. 
14 This figure uses the IFS data for NFA for the additional 19 emerging economies. 
15 The results hold for a number of other robustness tests, as in Table 4.4 for the sample for Europe. These results are 
available from the authors. 
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The estimates in Table 3.5 suggest that a country that was increasing its currency mismatch by 
5.7 percentage points each year in the sample period (equal to one standard deviation for this 
sample), would have higher GDP by up to 1.5 percent (depending on the specification) at the end 
of the period than a country that kept its currency mismatch the same, including the crisis—as 
above, this effect could be higher if one was able to include the recovery years.  
These results are also confirmed by a cross-country long-run growth regression that controls for 
standard growth determinants (Table 3.6).16 We estimate a regression with the average per capita 
PPP-adjusted GDP growth as the dependent variable, for the period 2000-2009.17 We control for 
the log of the initial per capita PPP-adjusted GDP, the age dependency ratio, the ratio of 
investment-to-GDP, the ratio of trade-to GDP, the inflation rate, the growth rate of the terms of 
trade, and a dummy variable for Europe. The estimate of the change in the currency mismatch 
index is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level in all specifications. The 
results from the first regression suggest that controlling only for the initial per capita GDP, 
countries that increased their currency mismatch the most during this decade grew faster. The 
second and third regressions show that this result holds even after controlling for the standard 
growth determinants in the literature. The fourth regression, by controlling for a dummy variable 
for European emerging economies in addition to the other variables, suggests that increasing 
currency mismatch was positively linked to growth even outside Europe. Finally, the last 
regression shows that currency mismatch has a positive and statistically significant estimate even 
after controlling for the change in the external debt-to-GDP ratio—which does not have a 
statistically significant estimate.  
The estimates for currency mismatch are also economically significant. They suggest that a 
country that increased its currency mismatch by 17.8 percentage points during this period (equal 
to one standard deviation) would have higher annual GDP per capita growth by 0.4 percent than 
a country that kept the same currency mismatch, even after we include the collapse of growth 
during the recent crisis (based on all specifications but the first, for which the estimated impact is 
even larger). The latter is key, because countries that increased their currency mismatch the most 
before the crisis, experienced the sharpest growth slowdown during the crisis (Figure 3.8).  
 
                                                            
16 See Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2004). 
17 The period starts in 2000, because of missing values for the currency mismatch index in earlier years. For 2009, 
we include projections from the IMF’s WEO database. The change in the currency mismatch is for the period 2000-




The theoretical section explained why currency mismatch should be viewed as a mechanism that 
relaxes credit constraints, especially those of agents with no access to international capital 
markets, and that such relaxation of constraints might lead to faster growth but might also 
generate financial fragility. The previous section studies these aggregate effects of currency 
mismatch and shows that adjusting for unhedged borrowers is key to have an appropriate 
measure of currency mismatch in the banking sector. In this section, we focus on these unhedged 
borrowers at the firm-level, and investigate whether the mechanism of our model is operative at 
the microeconomic level.  
In our model, currency mismatch increases aggregate growth because domestically oriented 
firms in financially constrained sectors that take on currency mismatch: (i) face lower interest 
rates; and (ii) grow faster than similar firms with no currency mismatch. Here, we examine 
whether firms with a currency mismatch face lower borrowing costs and grow faster, in no-crisis 
periods, compared with firms with similar characteristics but without a currency mismatch. 
Furthermore, we investigate whether firms that arguably are the most credit constrained—i.e., 
small firms in non-tradables sectors—benefit the most from currency mismatch.  
For the firm-level regressions presented in this section to be consistent with the model, it is 
necessary that firms with similar characteristics chose different levels of currency mismatch.  
This dichotomy emerges in the risky equilibrium of our model as a subset of borrowers who do 
not expect a bailout in case of a crisis do not take on currency mismatch. As long as the subset of 
borrowers without currency mismatch is small enough, a bailout will indeed be granted during a 
crisis, as a critical mass of borrowers will go bust. It therefore follows that in a risky equilibrium 
there can be two firms with the same observable characteristics, but with different bailout 
expectations. One firm will take on currency-mismatch and enjoy lower interest rates than the 
firm that does not, and so will be able to grow faster during no-crisis times. Our firm-level 
regressions assess whether this difference in interest rates and growth is present in the data, after 
controlling for a large battery of observable firm characteristics.18   
The sample includes around 10,000 firms in Central and Eastern Europe and in former Soviet 
republics, surveyed by the EBRD in 2005 and 2008 through the Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS).19 An advantage of this survey over existing stock-
market based data sets is that it is representative of all sectors in the economy and covers stock-
market listed as well as non-listed firms. A drawback, however, could be that the information on 
sales and terms of borrowing have been collected, through questionnaires and interviews, rather 
                                                            
18 In econometric terms, the identifying assumption is that after controlling for observable characteristics, there 
exists an unobservable random component that affects the choice of currency mismatch and is uncorrelated with 
future growth performance. In our model, this unobservable component corresponds to differences in bailout 
expectations. 
19 Table B.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis of this section. 
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than observed in audited balance sheets and financial statements.20 
We proceed in three steps. First, we form subsets of firms with similar characteristics and 
identify firms for which currency mismatch is clearly observable. Second, we analyze the link 
between currency mismatch and the terms of borrowing. And third, we measure the effect of 
currency mismatch on firm growth, while controlling for a large number of factors that could 
also determine the decision to borrow in foreign currency and firm performance. We use two 
empirical approaches: a simple linear regression framework and a propensity score matching 
technique that explicitly accounts for the possible endogeneity of currency denomination. 
Most of the results are based on the 2005 EBRD BEEPS survey. However, we also take 
advantage of the 2008 survey to estimate a panel regression and look at the impact of currency 
mismatch in 2004-2005 on the growth performance of firms during 2005-2008.21  
Sets of Firms with Currency Mismatch 
In order to make meaningful inferences, we analyze the effects of currency mismatch across sets 
of firms with similar characteristics. To this end, we consider only firms with debt on their 
books. We then partition this set into different subsets that capture, among other things, the 
sector, size and access to financial markets. 
We classify a firm as having currency mismatch if it has debt denominated in foreign currency 
that is not backed by foreign revenues. We consider two sets of firms with currency mismatch: 
firms with sales that come only from non-tradables sectors and firms that do not export.22 In the 
second set, the lack of foreign currency revenues is determined by the lack of exports, which, 
however, could be correlated with firm-specific characteristics that are related to performance 
and access to financial markets.23 Because of the latter, we take the set of non-tradable firms to 
be our preferred set, but analyze the effects of currency mismatch in the set of non-exporting 
firms. As firms in non-tradables sectors can have some exports (e.g. tourism), we also consider a 
third more restricted set of non-tradables firms with zero exports. 
Within each of these three sets of firms, we consider two subsets of firms with debt on their 
books. The first set includes firms with debt denominated in foreign currency, which form the 
“treated group”. The second set includes firms with debt denominated in domestic currency, 
which form the “control group”.  
In order to test whether the effect of currency mismatch is stronger in certain subsets of firms, we 
                                                            
20 Note our dataset benefits from some recent cleaning of the 2005 sales data performed by the World Bank, when 
the 2002-2008 panel version of the BEEPS data was put together.  
21We do not use the 2002 EBRD survey, because the question about foreign currency debt was different (see below). 
 
22 The list of non-tradable sectors is presented  in Table A.1 in the appendix. The largest non-tradables sectors by 
number of firms are wholesale retail and repair, and construction. 
23This is the selection into exports effect (see Melitz, 2003). 
20 
 
consider two additional partitions according to size and access to financial markets. First, we 
partition the set of firms according to whether they are small—have less than 100 employees—or 
they are large—have more than 100 employees. The small firms are the most likely to be credit 
constrained and dependant on bank financing. 
Second, we partition the set into those firms that are either listed in the stock market or are state-
owned, and those firms that are privately held.24 Listed firms have direct access to financing 
through equity markets. State-owned or quasi-public firms could also have access to special 
sources and terms of borrowing. 
The 2005 survey includes 10,421 firms in 28 countries,25 3,910 of which have at least one loan 
on their book: 2,955 firms have their last loan denominated in domestic currency and 955 firms 
in foreign currency. Out of this sample, 1,772 firms are in the non-tradable sector, 2,739 are 
small firms, 2,545 do no export and 3,325 firms are privately held and not listed. 
The 2005 EBRD survey reports only the currency denomination of the last loan for firms that 
have at least one loan on their books. We therefore assume that the denomination of the last loan 
reflects the denomination of the debt stock. Although this could be considered to be a strong 
assumption, the survey information on the last loan may be more reliable than information on the 
debt stock, with the latter possibly based on the memory of those answering the survey rather 
than on actual data.26 One could also consider the results as evidence from a cross-section on the 
determinants of the latest borrowing terms—interest rate and maturity—based on actual (last) 
loans, rather than “average information” on borrowing conditions during recent years. For 
similar reasons, for example, the Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) performed by the 
US Federal Reserve also asks only the information on the last loan. However, one potential 
pitfall when we analyze the link between currency mismatch and growth in sales between two 
periods is that the last loan might have been contracted after the initial period. For this reason, 
we perform a robustness test computing growth in sales between 2005 and 2008, and using  the 
last loan reported in the 2005 survey. 
Empirical Methodology 
Challenges in identifying the impact of currency mismatch on the borrowing conditions and 
performance of firms include dealing with possible endogeneity and omitted variable biases and 
with the non-randomness of the choice of currency denomination. In particular, one would need 
to control for variables that jointly determine the choice of currency denomination and the terms 
of borrowing, or firm performance. A strong identifying assumption is that such variables are 
observables, while a weaker assumption is that the relevant unobserved heterogeneity between 
                                                            
24There are very few non-tradable firms with less than 100 employees that are listed. 
 
25Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan ,Belarus  Bosnia , Bulgaria, Croatia,  Czech  Rep., Estonia, FYROM, Georgia, 
Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 
 
26Indeed, the answer to this question in the 2005 survey seems more reliable than the more general question asked in 
the 2002 survey, which was about the share of foreign currency borrowing in the stock of debt. 
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firms is highly correlated with what is observable. By analyzing the differential effect of 
currency mismatch across different sets of firms, our empirical approach already imposes some 
identifying restrictions. First, it looks at how firm performance is affected by currency mismatch, 
rather than by foreign borrowing more broadly. Second, it includes only firms with debt on their 
books, thus controlling for access to external debt finance. Third, it analyzes the effects of 
currency mismatch across different subsets of firms, including small nontradables firms, a set in 
which, arguably, currency mismatch relaxes borrowing constraints the most—as well as large 
firms.  
We start our empirical exercise by running two sets of linear regressions. In the first set, we 
regress the interest rate and the maturity of the loan on an indicator of currency mismatch and a 
set of firm-specific and loan-specific variables. In the second set, we run standard firm-level 
growth regressions with two alternative sets of control variables. In addition, we include a large 
array of fixed effects. We control for country-specific fixed effects, industry-specific fixed 
effects and, in the most stringent configuration, for country-industry fixed effects. The latter 
fixed effects control for the demand for goods and services in a specific industry and in a specific 
country. This is especially relevant for non-tradable firms whose demand is essentially domestic. 
In order to address some of the shortcomings of the linear regression framework and to test for a 
causal relationship between currency mismatch and terms of borrowing or firms’ performance, 
we implement a propensity score matching procedure. This procedure is designed to explicitly 
match firms that are similar in their likelihood of having a currency mismatch. The basic idea of 
propensity score matching is based on a simulation of a randomized experiment, in which we 
pair "treated" firms with "control" firms with similar characteristics that could affect the 
likelihood of having a currency mismatch and the outcome of currency mismatch. We then 
compare the means, across the treated and the control group, of the outcome variables of interest: 
interest rate, maturity, growth in sales, and growth in employment.   
One desirable feature of a matching framework is that the observations used to estimate the 
causal effect are selected without reference to the outcome, as in a controlled experiment. One 
important assumption however is that, conditional on the variables used to perform the matching, 
the expected value of the variable of interest in the absence of currency mismatch would be the 
same for the treated and the control firms that have been paired together. If this assumption 
holds, we should expect to see the control firms as identical twins of the treated firms, if the 
latter had not received treatment. Thus, the difference between the treated and control firms 
would be an appropriate estimate of the effect of currency mismatch—the treatment effect.27  
The basic econometric results supporting matching through a propensity score—defined as the 
probability of treatment conditional on the observables—are derived in Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) and discussed in details in the appendix of Levchenko, Ranciere and Thoenig (2009).  
                                                            
27 The PSM methodology has two major advantage over OLS: (i) The PSM allows estimation of the average impact 
of currency mismatch without arbitrary assumptions about functional forms and thus can account for both non-linear 
and interaction effects; (ii) By imposing a matching – that is certain degree of similarity between treated and control 
observation  -, the PSM methodology is likely to produce estimates that are less biased and  robust to miss-






Under our theoretical mechanism, currency mismatch enables firms to borrow at a lower interest 
rate, by allowing their lenders to exploit the implicit subsidy in systemic bailout guarantees. In 
the 2005 survey, firms report the currency denomination of their last loan, as well as its other 
characteristics. We regress the interest rate on the last loan on the currency denomination of that 
loan and two sets of controls: first, firm-specific controls, such as sales and years of operations; 
and second, loan-specific characteristics related to the collateralization of the loan. As discussed 
above, each specification is estimated for a different array of fixed effects: (i) country-specific 
fixed effects; (ii) country-specific and industry-specific fixed effects; and (iii) country-industry-
specific fixed effects.   
Table 4.1 reports the results for the set of small non-tradables firms. The estimates suggest that 
interest rates on foreign currency loans are between 2 and 2.5 percent lower than the ones on 
domestic currency loans. This effect is significant at the 1 percent level and holds in all the 
specifications. The control variables have the expected sign, with larger and older firms paying a 
lower interest rate. Additional controls capturing the effect of collateral reduce the estimated 
difference between foreign and domestic currency interest rates by only 0.3 percentage points.28  
The results in Table A.2 in the appendix for the smaller set of small non-tradables privately held 
non-listed firms with zero exports are very similar. This is also the case for the set of non-
exporting small firms in Table A.3 in the appendix. 
Loan Maturity 
The BEEPS survey does not provide information on the size of the loan and therefore we cannot 
test whether currency mismatch is associated with larger loans, as our theoretical framework 
would predict. However, we can use the maturity of the last loan as a proxy for the 
“commitment” made by the lender. We thus test whether loans associated with currency 
mismatch exhibit a longer maturity. We use the same specification as for the interest rate and 
repeat the exercise on the same three sets of firms.  
The estimates confirm the role of currency mismatch in relaxing borrowing conditions. Table 4.2 
shows that foreign currency loans to non-tradables firms have a maturity of 7 to 10 months 
longer than loans in domestic currency. This difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. Similar effects are shown in Table A.4 in the appendix for the set of small non-tradables 
privately held non-listed firms with zero exports. For the set of small non-exporting firms, the 
                                                            
28 Adding the maturity of the loan  to the regression does not change the results. The effect of the maturity variable  
is close to zero and insignificant. Results are available upon request. 
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difference in maturity is 10 to 12 months, as shown in Table A.5 in the appendix.29 30 
Growth in Sales 
Our theoretical framework implies that in tranquil times, firms with a currency mismatch 
outperform firms without a currency mismatch. The 2005 BEEP survey allows us to test this 
hypothesis, as it provides the cross-sectional information on the currency denomination of the 
last loan, as well as time series information on three-year growth performance between 2001 and 
2004. We estimate the following standard firm growth regression: 
titiitititi XCMyyy ,,3,3,, lnlnln εδβα ++++=− −− , 
where  is the firm’s sales, CM is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s last loan is 
denominated in foreign currency, X is a set of firm-specific control variables, 
tiy ,ln
δ is a set of fixed 
effects and ti ,ε  is the residual error term. Three combinations of fixed-effects are introduced: 
country-specific fixed effects, country and industry specific fixed effects, and country-industry 
fixed effects. Two sets of controls are considered. The simple control set includes firm’s years of 
operations and initial sales. The comprehensive control set includes initial productivity, the share 
of foreign inputs in total production inputs and two measures of the quality of the workforce: the 
share of skilled workers and the share of workers with a university degree. 31 
Table 4.3 presents the results for the sample of small non-tradable firms. The first three 
regressions are performed with the simple control set for the three combinations of fixed effects. 
The next three regressions include the comprehensive set of control variables. In all regressions, 
the currency mismatch indicator is positive and statistically significant at either the 1 or 5 percent 
level. On average, firms with a currency mismatch outperform firms without a currency 
mismatch by 6.6 to 8.8 percentage points, which are 2.2. to 2.9 percentage points per year. Table 
A.6 in the appendix shows that similar estimates are obtained for the smaller set of small, non-
listed and privately held nontradables firms, with no exports.  
Table A.7 in the appendix presents the results for the set of small non-exporting firms. While the 
results broadly confirm the above findings, the growth effect of currency mismatch is reduced by 
around half and is only significant in 3 out of 6 regressions. This result could be driven by non-
exporting firms in the manufacturing sector. The lack of exports in a manufacturing sector firm 
could be associated with a lower growth potential. Arguably such firms benefit less from 
investing and taking on risk through currency mismatch than nontradables firms that have 
profitable investment opportunities, but are credit constrained. 
Employment and Productivity Growth 
                                                            
29 Adding the interest rate of the loan to the regression does not change  the results. The effect of  the interest rate 
variable  is close to zero and insignificant. Results are available upon request. 
30 Table A.8. in the appendix reproduces the same regression with an alternative set of control variables. 
31The share of foreign input is likely to be a determinant of foreign currency loans.  
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The estimated growth benefits associated with currency mismatch could be driven by an increase 
in the quantity of inputs, or an increase in productivity. To examine which of these channels is 
operative, we estimate the above specifications, adding the growth of employment and the 
growth of labor productivity. The results in Table 4.4 for the set of small non-tradable firms 
suggest that sales growth is associated with employment growth, but not with productivity 
growth. These results are consistent with our theoretical model and with previous studies on the 
effect of financial liberalization (e.g. Levchenko, Ranciere, Thoenig, 2009). 
Large Firms 
Next we compare the expansionary effect of currency mismatch in the set of large firms with the 
effect in the different sets of small firms. Large firms are less likely than small firms to be credit 
constrained. Thus, under our theoretical mechanism, taking on currency mismatch should have 
less pronounced effects in large nontradables firms than in small nontradables firms. The 
estimates in Table 4.5 clearly show that this is the case. In the set of large nontradables firms, 
currency mismatch does not have a statistically significant impact on the interest rate paid by 
firms or their growth performance. 
Robustness Tests 
1. Interest Rate and Expected Exchange Rate Depreciation 
A possibility is that the difference in interest rate between domestic and foreign currency 
loans reflects the expected rate of currency depreciation. In order to control for this effect, we 
use data on one-year ahead currency forecasts for 14 countries in Emerging Europe from 
Consensus Forecast, Inc. to compute domestic interest rates that are adjusted for expected 
currency depreciation. We then re-estimate firm-level regressions on the effect of foreign 
currency borrowing on interest rate. The results are presented in Table 4.6.. Our baseline effect – 
foreign currency borrowing makes foreign borrowing cheaper – is robust to this adjustment. The 
effect is actually slightly larger. The reason is that in 2005, market participants were on average 
forecasting an  appreciation of many currencies in Emerging Europe. 
2. Uneven sampling. 
A potential issue is the uneven sampling of firms with respect to the population of firms across 
different countries. We propose here a test of robustness of our results to uneven sampling that 
follows Wooldridge (2001, Chapter 17.) 
 
Since we do not have information of firm demographics for many of the countries in the sample, 
we characterize over and under sampling in terms of the share of the labor force surveyed. First, 
we compute for each country the total number of employees in the firms surveyed. Second, we 
compute the ratio of the surveyed labor force to the total labor force in each country using World 
Development Indicator data for 2005. Third, we reestimate our baseline regressions for interest 
rates and sales using a weighted least square estimator (WLS),  using as weights the inverse of 
the ratio of surveyed to total labor force. Results are presented in Table 4.7. and confirm the 
findings of OLS regressions.  
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3. Reverse Causality 
Next, we use the 2008 survey to control for potential reverse causality running from growth 
performance to currency denomination of loans. We do so by combining in a single panel the 
2005 and the 2008 surveys, retaining only firms that have been surveyed in both surveys. An 
advantage of this approach is that we can assess the growth performance of firms that had a 
currency mismatch in 2004 over the subsequent period 2004-2007. As currency mismatch is 
predetermined in this case, this robustness test controls for potential reverse causality. A 
drawback is that by combining the two panels, the number of firms is reduced from 998 to 241 in 
the case of small non-tradable firms. Moreover, the inclusion of firms in both surveys may not be 
random. Note also that having initial currency-mismatch does not fully solve for endogeneity, as 
unobserved information on future growth potential can affect current borrowing choices. 
The results are presented in Table 4.8. The first two columns include results for the set of small 
non-tradable firms. The first column includes country-specific fixed effects, while the second 
column includes country-specific fixed effects and industry-specific fixed-effects. The last two 
columns report results for the set of small, non-listed, privately held non-tradable firms. In all 
specifications, firms with a currency mismatch at the beginning of the period experience a much 
stronger growth performance in the subsequent period, confirming the above results. This effect 
is significant at the 1 percent level and three times larger than the above estimates. 
Propensity Score Matching Results 
In contrast with the linear regression framework, for which we deal with selection issues by 
including control variables and fixed effects, Propensity Score Matching is designed to explicitly 
match firms that are similar in their likelihood of having a currency mismatch. The basic idea of 
propensity score matching is based on a simulation of a randomized experiment, in which we 
pair "treated" firms with "control" firms with similar characteristics that could affect the 
likelihood of having a currency mismatch and the outcome of currency mismatch.32    
The propensity matching procedure follows three steps. In the first step, we use a logit model to 
estimate the probabilities of a currency mismatch, which we call the propensity scores, for the 
sample of small non-tradables firms. The logit is based on firms’ characteristics and fixed 
effects.33 Next, following Dehejia and Wahba (2002), we group observations into intervals with 
similar propensity scores—referred to as propensity score strata—and test whether the means of 
each right-hand side variable do not differ across treated and non-treated units within each 
stratum.34 In the third step, we construct the relevant control group for each treated firm using a 
                                                            
 
33To make the results comparable with the results from the linear regression, we use the same set of control 
variables in the logit specification: years of operations,  past sales and country-fixed effects.  The specification is 
consistent with the findings of Brown, Ongena and Yesin (2009) who stress the importance of country-specific 
factors in explaining foreign currency borrowing. Similar results are obtained with country-industry fixed effect. 
 
34This is a test of the balancing hypothesis, which needs to be verified for the Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 




proximity measure based on propensity scores and compare the mean of the outcome variables of 
interest for the treated and the control group.35 For the proximity measure, we use the kernel 
matching estimator proposed by Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1998).  
The results are presented in Table 4.9 and indicate for each outcome—growth in sales, 
employment, interest rate and maturity—the difference in means for the treated group and the 
control group. Two control groups are considered: (i) a “naïve” control group that includes all 
firms without currency mismatch and thus does not deal with selection issues, and (ii) the 
matching-based control group. When the matching-based control group is used, the difference in 
means of outcome between the treated and control group measures the average treatment effect 
on the treated group. 
For the growth in sales, the mean differences are similar for both control groups. The matching 
estimator reports a 7.9 percentage points difference between treated and control firms, which is 
2.6 percentage points per year. This estimate is strikingly similar to the estimates obtained in the 
linear regressions in Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3. For the growth in employment, accounting for selection 
reduces the difference between control and treated groups from 14 to 10 percentage points. 
However, the difference remains statistically significant at the 10 percent level. For the interest 
rate, matching similar leads to a higher difference in interest rates between treated and control 
firms (2.7 vs. 1.8 percent). For the maturity, the average treatment of treated firms is 10 months 
and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
In order to understand the role played by the matching procedure and the correction for the 
selection effect, we can compare the PSM results to the results obtained by using an unmatched 
control group. In this case, the effect on sales is slightly lower (+6.6. percentage points vs. +7.0 
percentage point) as well as the effect on interest rate (-1.99 percentage points versus -2.81 
percentage points). 
In sum, the results obtained with the Propensity Score Matching method point in the same 
direction as the regression results. Under both methods, taking on currency mismatch reduces the 
interest costs of firms and improves their growth performance.  
 
5. Literature Review 
At the micro-level, much of the literature on the impact of currency mismatch in Latin America 
and East Asia (e.g. Allayanis et al. (2003), Bleakey and Cowan (2006, 2009)) uses samples of 
firms listed in the stock market and concludes that balance sheet effects associated with currency 
mismatch was a relatively minor issue. An exception is Kamil (2008) who uses a sample of listed 
and non-listed firms in Latin America and finds that pegged regimes are associated with a higher 
degree of currency mismatch. This later finding suggests that pegged regimes, by providing an 
implicit guarantee, encourages risk-taking, as our theoretical mechanism implies.  
                                                            
35The resulting effect is called the average treatment on treated. 
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In our firm-level regressions, currency mismatch relaxes borrowing constraints and increase 
growth in small firms but not in large firms. This result is consistent with the literature on firm 
size and credit constaints. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) find that financial development 
helps small firms more than large firms in Italy.  Beck, Demirgurc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005)  
using survey data find that the negative impact of reported obstacles on firm growth is stronger 
for small firms than large firms. Beck, Demirgurc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2008) using cross-
industry, cross-country data, find that financial development exerts a disproportionately positive 
effect on small firms.  
At the macro level, the early literature on currency mismatch primarily focused on economy-
wide aggregates, such as the ratio of foreign national debt to net exports (Eichengreen, 
Hausmann and Panizza (2007) review this literature). While, such measures capture external 
aggregate imbalances, they are not designed to capture sectoral imbalances that could also 
generate systemic risk. For instance, while an economy might have a low foreign currency debt 
relative to its net exports, that debt might be concentrated in borrowers with no foreign currency 
income. A recent literature has tried to address this concern by looking at sector level balance 
sheet data (e.g., Rosenberg, et.al. (2005)). Recently, Prat (2007) has made such an analysis for 
the banking sector. She computes the banks’ currency mismatch as the share of their foreign 
currency liabilities not covered by their foreign currency loans. From the perspective of 
capturing systemic risk, a shortcoming of her index is that it does not adjust for foreign currency 
loans made to unhedged borrowers. Our contribution is to make this adjustment and subtract 
from the banks foreign currency assets those loans made to agents with no foreign currency 
income. 
Our paper is also related to a recent literature on external imbalances in emerging Europe. 
Vamvakidis (2009) discusses the vulnerabilities of emerging Europe before the recent crisis, 
most of which resulted from high levels of external debt. Rosenberg and Tirpak (2009) 
investigate the determinants of foreign currency borrowing by the private sector. They find that it 
is explained mainly by the extent to which domestic banks finance credit expansion from abroad, 
the level of deposit dollarization, and the interest rate differential. Finally, Árvai, Driessen and 
Ötker-Robe (2009) examine the financial interlinkages within Europe and potential contagion 
channels. 
More generally, our paper relates to the sudden stops literature that analyzes the dynamics of 
different macro variables during a financial crisis (e.g. Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia, 2008 ).  The 
findings of this literature are consistent with our findings regarding crises.  An important 
difference is that we focus not only on crises, but also on the dual role of foreign currency debt, 
during normal times and during crisis.  In particular, our model concentrates on certain credit 
market imperfections and characterizes an equilibrium mechanism that generates high growth 
during the boom, and during a crisis the same mechanism works in reverse and generates a bust 




Conclusions and Policy Implications. 
In this paper, we have explored the dual role of currency mismatch. On the one hand, taking on 
currency risk relaxes borrowing constraints and could have a positive impact on growth. On the 
other hand, it could be a source of systemic risk, as it makes big parts of the economy prone to 
financial meltdown in case of a real depreciation. At the aggregate level, we found that higher 
increases in currency mismatch are associated with faster economic growth, even after we 
control for the recent crisis and its growth costs. At the firm level, we found that currency 
mismatch helps constrained firms that otherwise would not have been able to fund profitable 
projects—small firms and the nontradables sector.  
This evidence, however, does not justify excessive risk taking. Unchecked increases in currency 
mismatch in relatively financially developed countries—such as Poland--is not a good idea. 
Furthermore, {the unchecked development of} fast lending booms that simply finance 
consumption or overinvestment  are not desirable. Indeed, we find groups of firms for which 
undertaking currency mismatch is not associated with faster growth—large firms in the 
nontradables sector—or for which the growth effect is much more muted and in some cases 
insignificant—non-exporting firms in the manufacturing sector. Currency mismatch should be 
considered as a second-best policy that allows the financially constrained sector borrow more 
and adopt profitable projects.  The first-best is better enforceability of contracts, so that financial 
markets become deeper. 
Systemic bailout guarantees are often implicit and, as such, cannot be “outlawed” by decree. In 
the face of generalized defaults, governments face enormous pressure for a bailout regardless of 
whether a too-big-to-fail firm goes bust or a critical mass of small borrowers does so. This 
endogeneity has been revealed by the fact that all crisis-hit countries in emerging Europe granted 
bailouts despite differences in their policy regimes. Bailouts took several forms and were 
financed with the help of IMF Loans, foreign governments’ support as well as private sector 
involvement through the “Vienna initiative.” Very much like in the spirit of our model, this 
initiative was launched when it appeared that the depth of the crisis would depend on 
coordination (or lack of thereof) between lenders. The Vienna initiative avoided the halt of new 
lending and the resulting fire-sale of assets that would have resulted had banks pulled out of a 
country in panic (Bergloff, 2009). Foreign mother banks agreed to roll-over the exposure of their 
subsidiaries in Eastern European countries. They received powerful incentives to do so:  the IMF 
made loan disbursement decisions and the EBRD made banks’ equity injections de facto 
contingent on the existence of an agreement to rollover bank debt. In addition, mother bank’s 
countries allowed them to use some of the national bailout money to recapitalise their 
subsidiaries in Eastern Europe. 
In some countries, such as Latvia, the bailout took the form of supporting an otherwise 
unsustainable of the currency peg. The use of international reserves to defend the currency is 
analogous to a bailout, as it allows creditors to exit the country without suffering the effect of 
currency depreciation. The bailout, however, has not prevented a credit crunch. While domestic 
firm's balance sheets were not directly hit by a large nominal depreciation and generalized 
bankruptcies did not occur, the expectation of future real appreciation ceased to exist. As we 
explain in the theoretical section of this paper, a lending boom equilibrium with an appreciating 
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real exchange rate is supported by-–implicit or explicit—systemic bailout guarantees. After the 
crisis, the likelihood of a new bailout in case of a future crisis fell considerably, and so 
borrowing constraints became tighter. A downward feedback-loop mechanism started: less credit 
leads to less demand for nontradables, like real estate, which in turn puts downward pressure on 
nontradables prices, which reduces collateral values, which further reduces credit, and so on. The 
Vienna Initiative has successfully avoided a sharp real depreciation and generalized 
bankruptcies. However, one should not expect that it will stop the credit crunch and the 
associated real depreciation and the decline of the nontradables sector relative to the tradables 
sector that typically occurs in the wake of a crisis.  
  
Using our de-facto measure we have found that currency mismatches tend to be much larger than 
other measures that do not control for indirect mismatches in the banks’ balance sheets. It 
follows that in assessing systemic risk, policymakers should monitor not only mismatches in 
banks’ balance sheets, but should also look for indirect imbalances via the ability of banks’ 
borrowers to repay debts.  
The experience of emerging European economies has some parallels with the dollarization of 
Argentina in 1990s, but there are fundamental differences. Dollarization was meant to impose 
fiscal discipline by requiring the monetary base to follow moves in reserves. This regime failed 
to generate fiscal discipline in Argentina. Although some emerging European economies did 
have currency boards or fixed regimes, some others had floating regimes. Moreover, in both 
cases, fiscal deficits remained under control before the crisis, while some economies even had 
surpluses. 
A lesson from the emerging European is that to avoid excessive crisis costs, governments should 
have enough reserves--or have lined up external lines of credit—to cover the potential rollover 
requirements of the financial system that would realize if a crisis were to materialize. These lines 
of credit permit fiscally sound governments to smooth the effects of rare financial crises by 
allowing them to access financing in crisis and repaying by taxing during good times 
Even if some degree of macro-prudential regulation to limit foreign currency borrowing might 
appear desirable to avoid excessive risk-taking, its implementation is far from straightforward. In 
the presence of incentives to take on excessive risk, agents will eventually find ways around 
regulations. Indeed, prudential regulations in emerging Europe before the crisis required banks to 
match their foreign currency assets and liabilities and were formally satisfied by banks, as they 
were borrowing and lending in foreign currency. However, many of the recipients of such bank 
loans were not hedged. When regulators in some countries identified this indirect exposure of 
banks to exchange rate risks, they imposed stricter prudential regulations, reserve requirements, 
and direct restrictions on foreign currency borrowing by banks—for example in Croatia and in 
Romania—and, in some cases, on the amount of foreign currency loans or total credit that banks 
could extend—for example, in Bulgaria and in Croatia. Interestingly, banks often responded to 
such restrictions by helping their customers receive direct loans abroad—often with a letter of 
guarantee. From a systemic perspective, it made no difference whether the foreign currency loan 
came directly from abroad or was intermediated through domestic banks. As this paper has 




Finally, an inconvenient paradox of financial regulation is that it could reach the wrong target, 
harming the more financially constrained agents in the economy—those who precisely benefit 
the most from risk-taking—without disciplining the agents that are the source of excessive risk-
taking.  Following the recent crisis, governments around the world are considering new financial 
regulations to address systemic risks. At the same time, credit for new firms with investment 
opportunities that could help spur economic growth remains limited. Therefore, a key challenge 
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Appendix A. Model of Currency Mismatch and Relaxation of Borrowing Con-
ditions
Here, we formalize the intuitive argument we described in the text and show how certain
credit market imperfections can generate incentives for currency mismatch, which in turn al-
low for higher investment and growth, but also generate systemic risk. Consider an economy
with two sectors: a tradables (T) and a nontradables (N) sector. The T-good will serve as
the numeraire and we will denote by pt the price of the N-good in terms of the T-goodi.e.,
the inverse of the real exchange rate.
We focus on the interaction between lenders and N-sector borrowers in an environment
with contract enforceability problems and bailout guarantees.1 The typical N-rm has inter-
nal funds wt and borrows Bt. It then spends its investable funds in inputs that will produce
N-goods next period via a linear production technology: yt+1 = It: That is, the rms
budget constraint is
ptIt  wt +Bt: (1)
To allow for the possibility of currency mismatch we assume that N-rms can issue two types
of one-period bonds: N-bonds that have an interest rate Nt and whose promised repayment
is indexed to the price of N-goods, pt+1(1 + Nt )b
N
t ; and T-bonds that have an interest rate
t and whose promised repayment is not indexed, (1 + t)bt: We can interpret T(N)-debt as
foreign(domestic) currency denominated debt. To simplify the menu of nancing contracts,
we assume that rms either are fully unhedged or are fully hedged.
In order to understand the role of currency mismatch in relaxing nancing constraints and
in generating systemic risk, it is necessary to have a setup where (i) borrowing constraints
arise endogenously and (ii) there are incentives to take on insolvency risk. If borrowing
constraints were simply postulated as primitives in the model, we could not explain how
is it that currency mismatch relaxes nancing constraints and helps growth. In order to
generate borrowing constraints we assume that by incurring a non-pecuniary cost h[wt+Bt],
a borrower can engineer a scam that will allow her to divert the revenues to herself and not
repay any debt in the next period, provided the rm has positive notional prots.
In the absence of (ii), a systemic nancial crisis could never occur unless one assumed
a large economy-wide exogenous shock. There must be a reason that leads agents to take
on insolvency risk, but that does not eliminate borrowing constraints. Here, the reason is
that the government grants bailout guarantees if there is a systemic crisis, but not otherwise.
We introduce systemic bailout guaranteesby assuming that in case a majority of N-rms
defaults, the government pays lenders of non-diverting rms the promised debt repayment
amount. However, in case of an isolated default the government does not bail out lenders.
To close the model let tomorrows real exchange rate take on two values. With probability
u it takes an appreciated value (pt+1), while with probability 1   u it takes a depreciated
value (p
t+1
). Furthermore, we assume that there is enough real exchange rate variability
pt+1
pt





1The model is based on Schneider and Tornell (2004) and on Ranciere and Tornell (2009).
1
The rst inequality ensures that expected returns are high enough to make the production
of N-goods protable. The third inequality ensures that in a crisis the depreciation will be
large enough so as to bankrupt all N-rms with currency mismatch. Finally, the second
inequality is necessary for borrowing constraints to arise in equilibrium.
During period t; given his internal funds w, the owner of a representative N-rm borrows
from lenders. She then decides whether to implement a diversion scheme. At t+1 payo¤s are
as follows. If there is no diversion and no default, lenders receive their promised repayment




t and the owner gets the prots t+1: If there is no
diversion, but the rm defaults, lenders get Lt+1 if a bailout is granted and zero otherwise,
while the owner gets zero. Finally, if there is diversion, lenders get nothing and the owner
gets all the revenues pt+1qt+1:
It follows that lenders fund only plans that do not lead to diversion. Since they are risk
neutral and perfectly competitive lenders set the interest rates so that they break even, and
lend up to an amount so that developers dont divert.
Consider rst the case of no currency mismatch. In this case the rm issues only N-
bonds and in this way hedges its exposure to insolvency risk generated by real exchange rate
uctuations: prots will be t+1 = pt+1[qt+1  (1+Nt )bNt ]: Since lenders are risk neutral and
the opportunity cost of capital is 1 + r; the interest rate that they charge is
1 + nt =
1 + r
upt+1 + (1  u)pt+1
(3)
Furthermore, to avoid diversion by the rm, lenders impose the following borrowing con-
straint:
(1 + r)bnt  h(wt + bnt ): (4)
Since investment yields an expected return that is higher than the opportunity cost of capital
(by (2)), the rm borrows up to an amount that makes the credit constraint binding. Thus,
substituting (4) in budget constraint (1), we have that credit and investment are:
bnt = [m
s   1]wt Int = ms
wt
pt






Notice that a necessary condition for borrowing constraints to arise is h < 1 + r: If h; the
index of contract enforceability, were greater than the cost of capital, it would always be
cheaper to repay debt rather than to divert. Thus, lenders will not impose a ceiling on the
amount they are willing to lend and agents will not be nancially constrained. We can thus
think of emerging economies as ones with a degree of contract enforceability h less than 1+r:
Next, consider the case where there is currency mismatch. In this case the rm chooses
T-debt, and so it risks insolvency in the depreciation state because debt repayments will




qt+1   (1 + t)bt < 0: Such
currency mismatch might be optimal because the borrowing terms are more attractive.
Since lenders constrain credit to ensure that borrowers will repay in the no-crisis state,
it follows that in the no-crisis state debt is repaid in full and there is no bailout. Meanwhile,
in the crisis state there is bankruptcy and each lender receives a bailout equal to what he
2
was promised. Thus, the interest rate on T-debt is
1 + t = 1 + r: (6)
Notice that because of the bailout guarantee, the interest rate charged by lenders does not
internalize the risk that the rm will go bust.
Lenders will lend up to an amount that equates the debt repayment that the rm is
expected to make u[1+r]bt to the diversion cost h[wt+bt]: Therefore, substituting u[1+r]bt =
h[wt + bt] in budget constraint (1), we have that credit and investment are
bt = [m
r   1]wt It = mrwt
pt








We can now see that, in the presence of systemic bailout guarantees, taking on currency
mismatch has two e¤ects. First, it reduces the expected interest cost from 1+r to [1+r]u, as
revealed by a comparison of (6) and (3). Second, this reduction in expected debt repayments







( by (7) and (5)). This increase in leverage is possible because systemic guarantees
mean that in a crisis lenders expect to be bailed out.
The fact that T-debt is cheaper than N-debt does not imply that borrowers will always
be willing to issue T-debt. On can verify algebraically that in order for a borrower to choose
currency mismatch it is necessary that: (i)he expects a bailout if a crisis occurs next period
i.e., he believes a majority of borrowers chooses currency mismatch; (ii)the probability of
crisis next period 1  u is small a and (iii)there is enough real exchange rate variability (i.e.,
(2) holds). It then follows that a risky equilibrium exists if a majority of borrowers expects
a bailout in case of systemic crisis.
Proposition 0.1 (Risky Equilibrium) If a majority of borrowers believes that systemic
bailout guarantees are present and there is a small likelihood of a severe real exchange rate
depreciationi.e., condition (2) holds and probability 1   u is smallthen there is a risky
equilibrium in which a majority of borrowers take on currency mismatch. In this equilibrium:
1. Borrowers that take on currency mismatch have lower interest rate costs, as the gov-
ernment implicitly covers the depreciation premium.
2. Currency mismatch relaxes borrowing constraints as lower expected debt repayments
reduce the agency problems.
3. Currency mismatch leads to more investment and growth in no-crisis times.
4. However, rms that take on currency mismatch are vulnerable to bankruptcy in case of
a severe depreciation.
In our micro-level empirical analysis we test the implications of this proposition. In a
risky equilibrium there can be two rms with identical observable characteristics, but with
di¤erent bailout expectations. As a result a rm that expects a bailout will take on currency
mismatch while a rm that does not expect a bailout will not. Since both rms have the
3
same observable characteristics, we can thus attribute the di¤erences in interest rate costs
and growth rates to the adoption of currency mismatch.
For the macroeconomic analysis of currency mismatch consider a risky economywith
currency mismatchand a safe economy. The proposition above implies that the risky econ-
omy will have a higher average growth rate than the safe economy. However, the risky
economy will experiencerarecrises. We use this implication of the model.
We have taken the price path as exogenous. The next step is to embed the borrowing and
lending equations in a dynamic general equilibrium framework and conrm that equilibrium
prices satisfy (2). Such analysis is carried out by Schneider and Tornell (2004) and on




The measure of currency mismatch in the paper is the gap between foreign currency assets and 
liabilities, both with respect to residents and non residents (domestic and foreign net assets in 
foreign currencies), adjusted for an estimate of foreign currency lending that is not hedged, and 
divided by total bank assets. The formula of the calculation is the following:  
foreign currency denominated net liabilities = {foreign currency foreign liabilities + foreign 
currency domestic liabilities − foreign currency foreign assets − foreign currency domestic assets 
+ foreign currency lending to unhedged households +  foreign currency lending to unhedged 
nonfinancial firms} / {total bank assets}  
In more detail: 
• Foreign currency foreign assets include all foreign currency claims of the banking sector 
towards nonresidents, such as deposits, or loans in foreign currencies.  
• Foreign currency domestic assets include all foreign currency claims of the banking 
sector towards residents, such as foreign currency loans, which grew very rapidly during 
the recent boom in emerging Europe. 
• Foreign currency foreign liabilities include all foreign currency claims of nonresidents 
towards the domestic banking sector, such as loans of foreign banks, including parent 
foreign banks to their domestic subsidiaries, and foreign currency deposits of 
nonresidents. Bank loans from abroad reached high levels during the recent boom in 
emerging Europe. Foreign currency deposits of nonresidents were also substantial in 
some countries. 
• Foreign currency domestic liabilities include all foreign currency claims of residents 
towards the domestic banking sector, such as foreign currency deposits of residents. The 
latter have been historically very large in emerging Europe.36  
• Foreign currency lending to households is part of the banks’ foreign currency domestic 
assets. However, many households have no foreign currency income, and therefore, are 
not hedged when they borrow in foreign currency. Therefore, the calculation of the 
banks’ currency mismatch subtracts foreign currency lending to such households from 
                                                            
36 According to anecdotal evidence, during east Europe’s liberalization in the early 1990s, large amounts of foreign 
currency that were “held in mattresses,” primarily Deutsche Marks, were deposited in banks. They were later 
converted into euros. Initially, they served as a hedge against inflation, given memories of price instability during 
liberalization. Even though inflation stabilized at low levels in the current decade, most of these deposits remained, 
in some cases in anticipation of euro adoption. 
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the banks’ foreign currency assets, because such lending is assumed to be subject to 
exchange rate risk, directly for the households, and indirectly, through credit risk, for the 
banks. Private sector foreign currency deposits, including of households, are large in 
emerging Europe and do provide a hedge. However, we assume that households that 
already have large foreign currency deposits don’t need to also borrow in foreign 
currency—therefore, we have assumed mismatches between households with deposit and 
households with loans in foreign currency. As data on the share of households that are not 
hedged are not available, we have assumed that this share is equal to the share of firms 
without foreign currency income (where the households are employed). As a robustness 
test, we also consider the case in which households cannot hedge at all.  
• Foreign currency lending to nonfinancial corporates is also part of the banks’ foreign 
currency domestic assets. However, some of this lending goes to corporates that do not 
have foreign currency income and are, therefore, not hedged, resulting in credit risk for 
the banks and, indirectly, exchange rate risk. To adjust for the latter, we subtract foreign 
currency loans to nonfinancial corporates that have no foreign currency income from the 
banks’ foreign currency domestic assets (we assume that financial firms have foreign 
currency income). 
• Finally, we divide our measure by total bank assets, to adjust for the size of the banking 
sector in each country. We also test the robustness of the results when we divide our 
measure by GDP. 
Data sources for emerging Europe 
Data on foreign currency domestic and foreign asset and liabilities by sector and data on total 
bank assets are from Haver Analytics. Data are available for 10 countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine. These 
economies produce 86 percent of East Europe’s GDP, excluding Russia. Based on data 
availability, we measure currency mismatches for the period 1998-2009, although in most cases 
we focus on the boom and bust period between 2004-2007. Data on direct foreign currency from 
abroad, which are also discussed in the text and are added in the measure of currency mismatch 
as a robustness test, are from Rosenberg and Tirpak (2009). 
We use a number of sources for the share of foreign currency lending to corporates with no 
foreign currency income (which is also assumed to be the share of unhedged households in the 
baseline specification). Up to 2003, this share is based on EBRD survey data for 2002 and equals 
the share of nonexporting companies with foreign currency loans to total companies with foreign 
currency loans. For the subsequent years, we use EBRD survey data for 2005 for the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, and Poland.37 For Bulgaria and Romania, the share of 
                                                            
37 The EBRD survey data (BEEPS Firm Level Data) for 2002 refer to the stock of debt. However, the data for 2005 
refer to the last loan only. We have assumed that the latter applies to the stock of debt as well, which is an 
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unhedged foreign currency lending is given by the share of corporate foreign currency lending to 
tradable sectors, as estimated in Sorsa, Bakker, Duenwald, Maechler, and Tiffin (2007). For 
Croatia, it is based on Central Bank survey data for the share of foreign currencies loans to 
unhedged clients (this includes both households and corporates; see Hilaire and Ilyina (2007)). 
And for Latvia, it is estimated based on data provided by the central bank for the share of 
tradables in corporate foreign currency loans. The results remain robust if we use only EBRD 
data, or if we use only data from the sources described above for Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, 
and Latvia, and assume that the other countries have similar shares of unhedged foreign currency 
lending (taking the average, or the minimum). 
Data sources for other emerging economies  
A number of alternative sources were combined to expand the currency mismatch data set to 
additional emerging economies.  
Data on foreign currency loans to residents and foreign currency deposits of residents are from 
the confidential IMF Vulnerability Exercise for Emerging Economies, based on data provided by 
country authorities. Some gaps in the data on foreign currency deposits of residents are 
complemented by using data in Haver Analytics and in Arteta (2003 and 2005). 
We use various sources for the share of unhedged foreign currency borrowing in the corporate 
sector (as above, we assume that the share of unhedged borrowing is the same in both 
households and corporates). The share of unhedged foreign currency borrowing for Latin 
America is based on firm survey data in Kamil (2004 and 2009) and is assumed to be equal to 
the share of nonexporting companies with foreign currency loans to total companies with foreign 
currency loans. The share for other economies is from the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey 
(https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Portal/Login.aspx?ReturnUrl=%2fPortal%2felibrary.aspx%3
flibid%3d14&libid=14) and is also assumed to be equal to the share of nonexporting companies 
with foreign currency loans to total companies with foreign currency loans. We have assumed 
that a company with a share of foreign currency loans in total loans higher than 30 percent could 
be subject to exchange rate risk. If a company sells more than 70 percent of its products 
domestically then it is labeled as a nonexporter (the results are robust to alternative thresholds). 
The estimates using the World Bank data are for various years during the period that we are 
considering, for most cases during 2002-2004, but we use the earliest or the latest observation for 
the years before, or after respectively.  
For bank foreign assets and liabilities in foreign currency, we use data constructed by Prat (2007) 
for Argentina, Brazil, China, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Thailand, Turkey, 
and Uruguay. And we use IMF IFS data for Bosnia&Herzegovina, Costa Rica, Egypt, 
Guatemala, Kazakhstan, Serbia, Venezuela, and Vietnam. The latter, however, does not specify 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
approximation. The results are robust if we do not make this assumption and use other proxies instead, as the 
appendix discusses.  
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the currency denomination of the banks’ foreign assets and liabilities. We have therefore 
assumed that all the banks’ foreign assets and liabilities for these countries are denominated in 
foreign currency.  
The data for the long-run growth regressions are from the IMF World Economic Outlook 
database (October 2009), except of the trade share and the age dependency ratio, which are form 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.13. Sovereign Spreads, July 31st, 2007 - December 31st, 2008




















































































































































































Not adjusted for unhedged
lending
Figure 3.4. Currency mismatches and the economic boom and bust in emerging Europe 
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EU membership Euro adoption EU application Stabilization and Association 
Agreement
Candidate status Opening of EU 
Negotiations 
Albania             No No No Jun-06 No No
Belarus No No No No No No
Bosnia & Herzegovina No No No Jun-08 No No
Bulgaria            Jan-07 No Dec-95 n.a. n.a. Dec-99
Croatia No No Feb-03 Oct-01 Jun-04 Oct-05
Czech Republic May-04 No Jan-96 n.a. n.a. Mar-98
Estonia             May-04 No Nov-95 n.a. n.a. Mar-98
Hungary             May-04 No Mar-94 n.a. n.a. Mar-98
Latvia              May-04 No Sep-95 n.a. n.a. Dec-99
Lithuania           May-04 No Dec-95 n.a. n.a. Dec-99
Macedonia, FYR No No Mar-04 Apr-01 Dec-05 No
Moldova             No No No No No No
Poland              May-04 No Apr-94 n.a. n.a. Mar-98
Romania Jan-07 No Jun-95 n.a. n.a. Dec-99
Serbia No No No Apr-08 No No
Slovak Republic     May-04 Jan-09 Jun-95 n.a. n.a. Dec-99
Slovenia May-04 Jan-07 Jun-96 n.a. n.a. Mar-98
Turkey No No Apr-87 No Dec-99 Oct-05
Ukraine No No No No No No
Source: European Commission.
Table 1.1. EU membership and progress in EU application
2004 2007 2004 2007 2004 2007
Albania -5.2 -3.8 57.7 52.7 96.8 96.2
Belarus 0.0 0.4 9.1 11.5 67.6 67.5
Bosnia & Herzegovina -0.5 -0.1 25.5 30.1 56.2 62.8
Bulgaria            1.7 3.5 40.1 19.8 66.1 27.5
Croatia -3.4 -1.2 37.9 33.2 37.9 32.1
Czech Rep. -2.9 -0.6 30.4 28.9 . .
Estonia             1.6 2.9 5.0 3.4 . .
Hungary             -6.4 -4.9 59.4 65.8 . .
Latvia              -1.0 0.7 14.4 7.8 31.2 7.9
Lithuania           -1.5 -1.0 19.4 17.0 . .
Macedonia, FYR 0.4 0.6 36.6 23.4 81.1 59.3
Moldova             0.7 -0.2 47.3 27.7 61.5 40.0
Poland              -5.9 -2.0 46.7 44.8 43.2 32.3
Romania -1.0 -3.1 22.4 19.8 53.5 27.1
Serbia 0.0 -1.9 65.2 33.3 69.6 34.6
Slovak Rep. -3.2 -1.9 41.4 29.4 . .
Slovenia -1.3 0.3 27.2 23.4 . .
Turkey -4.3 -2.1 59.2 39.4 62.6 36.9
Ukraine -4.4 -2.0 25.3 12.8 58.3 21.0
Table 1.2. Selected general government indicators, emerging Europe, 2004-2007 
General government deficit/GDP General government debt/GDP Share of public sector long-term external 














IMF Arrangement Date Amount Assumed foreign 
bank rollover rate 
(in  percent)
Belarus Stand-By   12-Jan-09 6.9 60-70 … … 2.0 8.9 4.4
Bosnia and Herz. Stand-By   8-Jul-09 9.6 100.0 0.9 1.6 … 12.1 2.0
Hungary Stand-By   6-Nov-08 12.4 80.0 6.6 1.0 … 20.0 25.1
Latvia Stand-By   23-Dec-08 8.6 80.0 15.6 2.0 11.6 37.9 10.2
Poland Flexible Credit Line 6-May-09 5.2 100.0 … … … 5.2 20.8
Romania Stand-By   4-May-09 10.4 80-90 4.1 0.8 0.8 16.2 26.9
Serbia Stand-By   16-Jan-09 9.8 100.0 … … … 9.8 4.0
Ukraine Stand-By   5-Nov-08 14.2 85.0 … 2.6 … 16.8 19.3
Source: IMF country staff reports.
Table 1.3. External financing in Emerging Europe during the 2008-09 global financial crisis 
(in percent of 2009 GDP, except when indicated otherwise)
IMF 
Unadjusted
Including unhedged foreign currency loans from 
abroad
By households By firms Fully adjusted
Bulgaria -28.7 -26.7 -3.9 -1.9 2.0
Croatia 28.5 28.6 32.2 32.3 35.8
Czech Rep. -30.7 -30.7 -28.8 -28.8 -26.8
Estonia -33.1 -18.4 -13.1 1.5 4.9
Hungary -2.1 -0.9 4.9 6.1 8.4
Latvia              -31.0 -21.6 -19.1 -9.6 -9.0
Lithuania           -13.4 -9.7 -0.8 3.0 4.6
Poland              -7.3 -2.3 -4.3 0.7 2.3
Romania 12.1 18.0 24.9 30.8 35.0
Ukraine -43.2 -38.0 -26.3 -21.1 .
Unadjusted
Including unhedged foreign currency loans from 
abroad
By households By firms Fully adjusted
Bulgaria -31.9 -27.0 -4.0 0.9 6.9
Croatia 21.7 21.8 24.6 24.7 31.6
Czech Rep. -24.5 -24.4 -22.4 -22.4 -20.0
Estonia -25.9 3.5 4.3 33.7 39.3
Hungary -5.8 0.6 1.6 8.0 11.2
Latvia              -26.3 -5.7 -5.4 15.1 17.4
Lithuania           -5.1 2.7 6.3 14.1 17.0
Poland              -9.1 -4.9 -3.8 0.4 2.6
Romania 10.9 22.8 23.5 35.4 39.5
Ukraine -34.2 -20.9 -19.7 -6.3 .
Source: authors' calculations (see Appendix).
Note: the numerator is expressed as liabilities minus assets, and therefore, an increase in the above percentages reflects 
an increase in currency mismatch.
Adjusted for unhedged foreign currency borrowing from 
domestic banks
Table 3.1. Currency Mismatches in Emerging Europe in Percent of Bank Sector Assets: Adjusting for Unhedged Borrowing, 2004-2007
2004
Adjusted for unhedged foreign currerncy borrowing from 
domestic banks
2007
2004 2007 Change 2004 2007 Change 2004 2007 Change
Bulgaria 2.8 4.5 1.7 0.3 0.6 0.2 -1.9 0.9 2.8
Croatia 3.5 5.0 1.5 0.4 0.6 0.3 32.3 24.7 -7.6
Czech Rep. 1.2 1.0 -0.2 . . . -28.8 -22.4 6.4
Estonia 4.1 5.0 0.9 0.4 0.6 0.2 1.5 33.7 32.2
Hungary 5.4 4.4 -1.0 0.3 0.2 0.0 6.1 8.0 1.9
Latvia              3.4 10.0 6.6 0.2 0.4 0.1 -9.6 15.1 24.7
Lithuania           3.7 4.0 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.3 3.0 14.1 11.1
Poland              3.2 4.5 1.3 0.4 0.3 -0.1 0.7 0.4 -0.3
Romania 4.7 9.0 4.3 0.1 0.5 0.4 30.8 35.4 4.6
Ukraine 2.0 3.8 1.7 0.3 0.3 0.0 -21.1 -6.3 14.8
Correlation with new measure 0.7 0.7 0.3 -0.2 0.5 0.0 … … …
Rank Correlation with new measure 0.8 0.8 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.1 … … …
Note. Standard currency mismatch measures in the literature divide net external debt or external debt service with exports or net exports. 
As most emerging European economies had negative next exports before the crisis, the denominator in the table is total exports. 
An increase in all measures reflects higher currency mismatch.
Table 3.2. Currency Mismatch Measures in Emerging Europe, 2004-2007
Net external debt/exports External debt service/exports Foreign currency denominated net 
unhedged liabilities/total bank assets
Change in currency mismatch 0.11** 0.12** 0.12* 0.11*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Lagged change in currency mismatch 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04
(0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06)
Crisis dummy -12.93*** -13.42*** -12.97*** -14.01***
(0.60) (1.64) (2.42) (2.63)
Interaction term: (change in currency mismatch) x 
(crisis dummy) -0.10** -0.22 0.01 -0.14
(0.05) (0.18) (0.39) (0.40)
Interaction term: (lagged change in currency 
mismatch) x (crisis dummy) -0.84*** -0.84*** -0.69 -0.68
(0.05) (0.13) (0.87) (0.96)
Time trend -0.16 -0.09
(0.27) (0.23)
Change in external debt/GDP 0.05 0.07
(0.11) (0.08)
Adjusted R2 0.68 0.68 0.65 0.65
Number of countries 10 10 10 10
Table 3.3. Currency mismatch and growth in emerging Europe, 1998-2009
Random effects Fixed effects
Note: The dependent variable is real GDP growth (the results are robust if per capita real GDP, or PPP-adjusted per capita real GDP is used instead). 
The GDP data are from the IMF World Economic Outlook database (October 2009), with projections for 2009. Currency mismatch is measured as 
explained in the text and the appendix. The crisis dummy takes the value of 1 in 2009, which is the year when growth turned negative throughout 
emerging Europe. The sample includes 10 emerging European economies: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Rep., Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, and Ukraine. The period is 1998-2009. The specification with random effects is the preferred specification, based on both the 
likelihood ratio and the Hausman tests. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Change in currency mismatch 0.11** 0.11** 0.11** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.08**
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04)
Lagged change in currency mismatch 0.09** 0.06 0.09** 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.09** 0.13 0.20*** 0.16* 0.20*** 0.03 0.03*
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.08) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02)
Crisis dummy -13.13*** -13.04 -13.25*** -12.01*** -12.48*** -12.13*** -12.38*** -11.47** -12.92** -11.47** -12.45***
(0.64) (1.75) (1.77) (0.58) (0.62) (1.70) (1.97) (1.57) (0.65) (1.57) (2.02)
Interaction term: (change in currency mismatch) 
x (crisis dummy) -0.14 -0.27 -0.3 -0.77*** -0.75***
(0.22) (0.04) (0.21) (0.07) (0.18)
Interaction term: (lagged change in currency 
mismatch) x (crisis dummy) -0.89*** -0.85*** -0.88*** -0.99*** -0.90*** -0.96*** -0.90*** -1.97*** -1.50*** -1.89*** -1.52***
(0.04) (0.14) (0.24) (0.04) (0.04) (0.12) (0.25) (0.08) (0.05) (0.15) (0.35)
EU membership dummy 1.11* 1.38*** 1.01* 1.53** 0.34 1.40* 0.58 0.77
(0.60) (0.47) (0.59) (0.59) (0.56) (0.73) (0.47) (0.62)
Time trend -0.29 -0.30 -0.29 -0.32 -0.26 -0.34 -0.05 0.12
(0.24) (0.27) (0.24) (0.27) (0.25) (0.29) (0.12) (0.12)
Change in external debt/GDP 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.05* 0.01
(0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.26) (0.10) (0.11) (0.03) (0.03)
Change in nontradables/GDP 1.23** 0.68*
(0.49) (0.35)
Interaction term: (change in currency mismatch) 
x (change in nontradables/GDP) -0.04
(0.05)
Interaction term: (lagged change in currency 
mismatch) x (change in nontradables/GDP) 0.12** 0.06*
(0.05) (0.03)
Adjusted R2 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.74 0.71 0.73 0.71 0.30 0.22
Number of countries 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Note: The dependent variable is real GDP growth (the results are robust if per capita real GDP, or PPP-adjusted per capita real GDP is used instead). The GDP data are from the IMF World Economic Outlook database (October 2009), with projections for 2009. Currency 
mismatch in regressions (1)-(3), (12) and (13) is measured as explained in the text and the appendix. In regressions (4)-(7), the currency mismatch measure assumes that households don't hedged exchange rate risk at all. In regressions (8)-(11), currency mismatch is divided 
by GDP instead of total bank assets. The crisis dummy takes the value of 1 in 2009, which is the year when growth turned negative throughout emerging Europe. The sample includes 10 emerging European economies: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Rep., Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine. The period is 1998-2009, except for regressions (12) and (13), in which the period is 1998-2007, because data for the production of nontradables is not available for more recent years--therefore, these specifications do not 
include the crisis dummy. The specifications are estimated with random effects (based on both the likelihood ratio and the Hausman tests). Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent le
Table 3.4. Currency mismatch and growth in emerging Europe, 1998-2009, robustness tests
Baseline currency mismatch measure Assuming households don't hedge Currency mismatch divided by GDP
Controlling for the increase in 
nontradables (1998-2007)
Change in currency mismatch 0.07** 0.07** 0.09** 0.09**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Lagged change in currency mismatch 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Crisis dummy -13.42*** -14.09*** -13.02*** -13.80***
(0.56) (1.69) (0.78) (1.71)
Interaction term: (change in currency mismatch) x (crisis 
dummy) -0.06** -0.02 0.04 0.09
(0.03) (0.09) (0.06) (0.21)
Interaction term: (lagged change in currency mismatch) x 
(crisis dummy) -0.83*** -0.92*** -0.71*** -0.77***
(0.04) (0.07) (0.11) (0.10)
Time trend 0.23 0.19
(0.30) (0.33)
Change in external debt/GDP -0.05 -0.05
(0.06) (0.10)
Adjusted R2 0.53 0.53 0.5 0.50
Number of countries 29 29 29 29
Table 3.5. Currency mismatch and growth in emerging economies, 1998-2009
Random effects Fixed effects
Note: The dependent variable is real GDP growth from the IMF World Economic Outlook database (October 2009), with projections for 2009. Currency mismatch is 
measured as explained in the text and the appendix.  The sample includes 29 emerging economies: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, China, 
Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Rep., Egypt, Estonia, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Serbia, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay and Venezuela, and Vietnam. The crisis dummy takes the value of 1 in 2009. The period is 1998-2009. The 
preferred specification includes random effects (based on both the likelihood ratio and the Hausman tests). Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
Change in currency mismatch 0.03** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Initial per capita GDP -1.10 -1.04*** -1.11** -1.21** -1.68***
(0.68) (0.37) (0.38) (0.47) (0.41)
Age dependency ratio -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.12***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Investment/GDP 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.13**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Trade/GDP -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Inflation rate 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Growth of terms of trade 0.10 0.12 0.08
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Europe dummy 0.32 -0.23
(0.85) (0.95)
Change in external debt/GDP 0.02
(0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.1 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.71
Observations 29 29 29 29 29
Table 3.6. Currency mismatch and long-run growth in emerging economies, 2000-2009
Note: Cross-country regressions, for the period 2000-2009 (projections from the IMF’s WEO database for 2009). The dependent variable is average real 
GDP per capita PPP-adjusted growth. Currency mismatch is measured as explained in the text and the appendix. All other data are from the IMF World 
Economic Outlook database (October 2009), except of the trade share, external debt and the age dependency rate, which are from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. The sample includes 29 emerging economies: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, 
Czech Rep., Egypt, Estonia, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, 
Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay and Venezuela, and Vietnam (Argentina, drops from the sample because we do not have data for recent years). 
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
Table 4.1.  Loan Interest Rate and Currency Mismatch
Dependant Variable Interest Rate on Last Loan Reported in 2005 BEEPS Survey
Sample Small Firms in Non-Tradables Sectors
Estimation OLS
Currency Mismatch Dummy -2.50*** -2.46*** -2.31*** -2.28*** -2.23*** -2.04***
-0.37 -0.37 -0.41 -0.4 -0.4 -0.44
Log of Sales  (2004) -0.29*** -0.33*** -0.37*** -0.24* -0.27** -0.29**
-0.11 -0.11 -0.12 -0.13 -0.13 -0.14
Log of Years in Operation -0.76*** -0.76*** -0.63** -0.68** -0.69** -0.47
-0.27 -0.28 -0.3 -0.29 -0.3 -0.34
Collateral Dummy for:
   Land or Building 0.46 0.48 0.56
-0.36 -0.37 -0.41
  Equipment 0.011 -0.02 0.16
-0.49 -0.5 -0.52
  Accounts Receivable 1.17* 1.22* 1.55*
-0.69 -0.71 -0.86
  Personal Assets -0.51 -0.5 -0.5
-0.65 -0.66 -0.59
 Other Collateral 0.42 0.46 0.16
 -0.6 -0.61 -0.62
Number of Firms 986 986 986 821 821 821
Adjusted R-squared 0.614 0.613 0.624 0.609 0.608 0.628
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No No Yes No
Country-Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes:  the currency mismatch dummy is equal to 1 if last loan is denominated in foreign currency and  0 if last loan is denominated in domestic currency.  Small 
Firms are firms with less than 100 employees. The list of non-tradables sector is presented in Table A.1 in the appendix. Heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors are reported. 
Table 4.2. Loan Maturity and Currency Mismatch
Dependant Variable Maturity in Months on Last Loan Reported in 2005 BEEPS Survey
Sample Small Firms in Non-Tradables Sectors
Estimation OLS
Currency Mismatch Dummy 10.2*** 10.4*** 8.84*** 8.28*** 8.41*** 6.88*
-2.9 -2.89 -3.17 -3.1 -3.06 -3.52
Log of Sales  (2004) -0.038 0.42 0.3 0.00087 0.44 0.65
-0.9 -0.9 -1.03 -1.05 -1.06 -1.28
Log of Years in Operation -2.76 -2.68 -2.56 -3.25 -2.97 -3.06
-1.9 -1.93 -2.07 -2.34 -2.36 -2.71
Collateral Dummy for:
   Land or Building 1.21 2.11 0.32
-3.25 -3.33 -3.62
  Equipment 7.55** 7.69** 5.09
-3.62 -3.67 -4.21
  Accounts Receivable 10.7** 10.7** 9.10*
-4.59 -4.68 -5.28
  Personal Assets 5.68* 5.70* 4.21
-3.13 -3.09 -3.33
 Other Collateral 9.07** 7.87** 6.53
-3.95 -3.89 -4.53
37.2*** 40.6** 31.8** -26.4 -23.1 -19.6
Number of Firms 1000 998 998 831 829 829
Adjusted R-squared 0.109 0.123 0.124 0.108 0.124 0.109
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No No Yes No
Country-Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: the  currency mismatch dummy is equal to 1 if last loan is denominated in foreign currency and  0 if last loan is denominated in domestic 
currency.  Small Firms are firms with less than 100 employees. The list of non-tradables sector is presented in Table A.1 in the appendix. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported. 
Table 4.3.  Growth in Sales and Currency Mismatch
Dependant Variable Growth in  Sales between 2001 and 2004
Sample Small Firms in Non-Tradables Sectors
Estimation OLS
Currency Mismatch Dummy 0.087*** 0.081** 0.088** 0.070** 0.066** 0.070**
-0.032 -0.032 -0.035 -0.033 -0.033 -0.035
Initial Log of Sales (2001) -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.045*** -0.019* -0.021* -0.025**
-0.0099 -0.01 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.012
Log of Years in Operation -0.026 -0.025 -0.018 -0.047* -0.045* -0.031
-0.025 -0.025 -0.027 -0.026 -0.026 -0.028
Initial Labor Productivity -0.062*** -0.057*** -0.056***
 Log(Sales/Employement) in 2001 -0.017 -0.018 -0.02
Share of Foreign Input in Production 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 0.0012***
-0.00038 -0.00041 -0.00043
Share of Employees with a University Degree 0.0013*** 0.0013** 0.0012**
-0.00047 -0.0005 -0.00054
Share of Skilled Workers 0.024 0.019 -0.0083
-0.047 -0.048 -0.051
Number of Firms 1010 1008 1008 955 953 953
Adjusted R-squared 0.049 0.051 0.06 0.073 0.072 0.081
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Industry Fixed Effectd No Yes No No Yes No
Country-Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes:  growth in sales is defined as log difference in sales between 2004 and 2001. the  currency mismatch dummy is equal to 1 if last loan is denominated in 
foreign currency and  0 if last loan is denominated in domestic currency.  Small Firms are firms with less than 100 employees. The list of non-tradables sectors\ is 
presented in Table A.1 in the appendix. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported. 
Table 4.4. Employement Growth, Productivity Growth and Currency Mismatch
Dependant Variable Employment Growth  (2001-2004) Labor Productivity Growth  (2001-2004)
Sample Small Firms in Non-Tradables Sectors
Estimation OLS
Currency Mismatch Dummy 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.0099 0.021 0.0073
-0.036 -0.037 -0.038 -0.037 -0.037 -0.039
Initial Log of Employement (2001) -0.18*** -0.19*** -0.19***
-0.017 -0.017 -0.017
Initial Log of Labor Productivity (2001) -0.34*** -0.36*** -0.36***
-0.029 -0.033 -0.036
Log of Years in Operation -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.093***
-0.032 -0.033 -0.033 -0.028 -0.028 -0.031
Number of Firms 1315 1312 1312 1001 999 999
Adjusted R-squared 0.187 0.194 0.228 0.357 0.372 0.394
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No No Yes No
Country-Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes:  growth in employment is defined as log difference in sales between 2004 and 2001.  Productivity growth is defined as log difference in the ratio of sales to 
employement. the  currency mismatch dummy is equal to 1 if last loan is denominated in foreign currency and  0 if last loan is denominated in domestic currency.  
Small Firms are firms with less than 100 employees. The list of non-tradables sectors is presented in Table A.1 in the appendix. Heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors are reported. 
Table 4.5. Interest Rate, Growth in Sales and Currency Mismatch. Estimation on a Sample of Large Firms
Panel A: Interest Rate
Dependant Variable Interest Rate on Last Loan Reported in 2005 BEEPS Survey
Sample Large Firms in Non-Tradables Sector
Estimation OLS
Currency Mismatch Dummy 0.47 0.5 1.49
-1.31 -1.32 -1.68
Log of Sales (2004) -0.41 -0.67** -0.47
-0.32 -0.31 -0.34
Log of Years in Operation -0.057 -0.14 0.19
-0.47 -0.5 -0.62
Number of Firms 228 228 228
Adjusted R-squared 0.54 0.543 0.605
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes No
Industry Fixed Effectd No Yes No
Country-Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes
Panel B: Growth in Sales
Dependant Variable Growth in  Sales between 2001 and 2004
Sample Large Firms in Non-Tradables Sector
Estimation OLS
Currency Mismatch Dummy -0.02 -0.022 -0.015
-0.043 -0.049 -0.061
Initial Log of Sales (2001) -0.084*** -0.088*** -0.10***
-0.023 -0.023 -0.036
Log of Years in Operation -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.14***
-0.031 -0.032 -0.044
Number of Firms 233 233 233
Adjusted R-squared 0.196 0.189 0.126
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes No
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No
Country-Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes:  The currency mismatch dummy is equal to 1 if last loan is denominated in foreign currency and  0 if last loan is denominated in 
domestic currency.   Growth in sales is defined as the log difference in sales between 2004 and 2001. Large Firms are firms with more than 
100 employees. The list of non-tradables sector is presented in Table A.1 in the appendix. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are 
reported.  
Table 4.6.  Loan Interest Rate and Currency Mismatch; Robustness: The Role of Exchange Rate Depreciation
Dependant Variable Interest Rate on Last Loan Reported in 2005 BEEPS Survey
Sample Small Firms in Non-Tradables Sectors
Estimation OLS
Currency Mismatch Dummy -3.49*** -3.47*** -3.40*** -3.12*** -3.09*** -2.76***
-0.49 -0.5 -0.54 -0.55 -0.55 -0.57
Log of Sales  (2004) -0.24* -0.29** -0.30** -0.22 -0.27* -0.23
-0.12 -0.12 -0.13 -0.16 -0.15 -0.16
Log of Years in Operation -0.94*** -0.92*** -0.91** -0.75** -0.72* -0.70*
-0.34 -0.34 -0.36 -0.38 -0.38 -0.4
Collateral Dummy for:
   Land or Building 0.028 0.012 -0.074
-0.43 -0.43 -0.46
  Equipment -0.29 -0.33 -0.39
-0.58 -0.59 -0.6
  Accounts Receivable 0.57 0.6 1.06
-0.7 -0.73 -1.02
  Personal Assets -0.63 -0.67 -0.69
-0.9 -0.91 -0.78
 Other Collateral 0.33 0.42 0.13
 -0.7 -0.72 -0.7
Number of Firms 661 660 660 539 538 538
Adjusted R-squared 0.636 0.636 0.646 0.629 0.63 0.654
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No No Yes No
Country-Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes:  the currency mismatch dummy is equal to 1 if last loan is denominated in foreign currency and  0 if last loan is denominated in domestic currency.  Small
Firms are firms with less than 100 employees. The list of non-tradables sector is presented in Table A.1 in the appendix. Heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors are reported.  The domestic interest rate have been adjusted for exchange rate depeciation using one-year ahead forecasts from Consensus Forecast Inc.
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Table 4.7. Interest Rate, Growth in Sales and Currency Mismatch. Robustness: Weighted Least Square Estimati
Panel A: Interest Rate
Dependant Variable Interest Rate on Last Loan Reported in 2005 BEEPS Survey
Sample Small Firms in Non-Tradables Sector
Estimation Weighted Least Square
Currency Mismatch Dummy -3.52*** -3.35*** -3.24***
-0.5 -0.51 -0.58
Log of Sales (2004) -0.26 -0.33** -0.37**
-0.16 -0.16 -0.17
Log of Years in Operation -1.04*** -1.07*** -0.96***
-0.32 -0.33 -0.36
Number of Firms 961 959 959
Adjusted R-squared 0.581 0.583 0.587
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes No
Industry Fixed Effectd No Yes No
Country-Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes
Panel B: Growth in Sales
Dependant Variable Growth in  Sales between 2001 and 2004
Sample Small Firms in Non-Tradables Sector
Estimation Weighted Least Square
Currency Mismatch Dummy 0.11* 0.11** 0.11**
-0.062 -0.057 -0.054
Initial Log of Sales (2001) -0.036 -0.037 -0.021
-0.036 -0.037 -0.038
Log of Years in Operation -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.042***
-0.014 -0.014 -0.015
Number of Firms 983 981 981
Adjusted R-squared 0.05 0.053 0.06
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes No
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No
Country-Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes:  The currency mismatch dummy is equal to 1 if last loan is denominated in foreign currency and  0 if last loan is denominated in 
domestic currency.   Growth in sales is defined as the log difference in sales between 2004 and 2001. The list of non-tradables sector is 
presented in Table A.1 in the appendix. The weights used for the WLS estimation are country-specific. They correspond to the the inverse of 
the ratio of surveyed labor force to total labor force for each country. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported.  
Table 4.8.  Growth in Sales and Currency Mismatch: Evidence from Firms in  both the 2005 and the  2008 surveys
Dependant Variable Growth in  Sales between 2004 and 2007
Sample Small Firms in Non-Tradables Sectors
(unresrtricted sample) (resrtricted sample)
Estimation OLS
Currency Mismatch Dummy  (Initial Survey) 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.46*** 0.45***
-0.064 -0.069 -0.089 -0.081
Initial Log of Sales (2004) -0.24*** -0.27*** -0.23*** -0.26***
-0.036 -0.031 -0.034 -0.033
Log of Years in Operation 0.052 0.11 -0.17 -0.14
-0.26 -0.24 -0.14 -0.13
Number of Firms 241 241 189 189
Adjusted R-squared 0.155 0.162 0.192 0.185
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No No
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes:  growth in sales is defined as log difference in sales between 2007 and 2004. the  currency mismatch dummy is equal to 1 if last loan is denominated in foreign currency 
and  0 if last loan is denominated in domestic currency in 2005 survey.  Small Firms are firms with less than 100 employees. The list of non-tradables sectors is presented in Table 
A.1 in the appendix.  In Col. 3 and Col.4 the sample is of small firms in non-tradables sector is further restricted to privately-held firms, non-listed on the stock market and with no 
exports.  Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at industry-level are reported. 
 Table 4.9 Propensity Score Matching Estimation Results








Difference Treated-Matched : 
Average Treatment on Treated  
Mean Growth in Sales (2001-2004) 0.167 0.101 0.087 .066**   (0.031) .079**   (.038)
Mean Growth in Employement (2001-2004) 0.239 0.091 0.133 0.147***   (0.0493)  0.105*   ( 0.057)
Interest Rate on Loast Loan (2005) 12.7 14.69 15.51 -1.99***   (0.584)  -2.81***   (.681)
Maturity of Last Loan (2005) 39.88 29.78 29.76 10.09*** (2.56) 10.12***   (3.49)
Treated  Units Control Unit Total  
Number of Observation with common PSM 
support 200 687 887   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
Notes:  The PSM estimation is based on propensity scores esimtated from a logit regression of currency mismatch on sales and years of operations and country-specific effects.  The matching procedure used 
the kernel estimator of Heckmam, Todd ( 1998). The Sample include the small firms (less than 100 employees) in non-tradable sectors. Standard Erros are in parenthesis next to the corresponding coefficients.
Table A.1 Sectoral Classification in 2005 BEEPS Survey
Mining and quaarying Tradables
Construction Non-tradables
Manufacturing Tradables
Transport, Storage and Communication Non-tradables
Wholesale, retails, repairs Non-tradables
Real estage, renting and business services Non-tradables
Hotel and Restaurants Non-tradables
Table A.2.  Loan Interest Rate and Currency Mismatch
Dependant Variable Interest Rate on Last Loan Reported in 2005 BEEPS Survey
Sample Small Firms in Non-Tradables Sectors (Restricted)
Estimation OLS
Currency Mismatch Dummy -2.56*** -2.55*** -2.40*** -2.25*** -2.24*** -1.97***
-0.44 -0.44 -0.49 -0.46 -0.47 -0.52
Log of Sales  (2004) -0.16 -0.22* -0.27* -0.11 -0.16 -0.27
-0.13 -0.13 -0.14 -0.15 -0.15 -0.17
Log of Years in Operation -0.89*** -0.87** -0.59* -0.68* -0.68* -0.26
-0.33 -0.34 -0.34 -0.36 -0.37 -0.36
Collateral Dummy for:
   Land or Building 0.58 0.57 0.72
-0.4 -0.41 -0.48
  Equipment -0.35 -0.33 -0.22
-0.59 -0.59 -0.64
  Accounts Receivable 1.43 1.49 1.1
-0.98 -1 -0.94
  Personal Assets -0.83 -0.81 -0.78
-0.64 -0.66 -0.63
 Other Collateral 0.37 0.43 0.00097
-0.69 -0.7 -0.7
Number of Firms 766 766 766 648 648 648
Adjusted R-squared 0.601 0.6 0.614 0.596 0.594 0.615
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No No Yes No
Country-Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: the  currency mismatch dummy is equal to 1 if last loan is denominated in foreign currency and  0 if last loan is denominated in domestic currency.  
Small Firms are firms with less than 100 employees.  The sample is of small firms in non-tradables sector is further restricted to privately-held firms, non-
listed on the stock market and with no exports. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported. 
Table A.3.  Loan Interest Rate and Currency Mismatch
Dependant Variable Interest Rate on Last Loan Reported in 2005 BEEPS Survey
Sample Small Firms with No Exports
Estimation OLS
Currency Mismatch Dummy -2.41*** -2.41*** -2.51*** -2.32*** -2.30*** -2.35***
-0.33 -0.33 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.37
Log of Sales  (2004) -0.15 -0.20** -0.20** -0.16 -0.21* -0.22*
-0.093 -0.095 -0.1 -0.11 -0.11 -0.12
Log of Years in Operation -0.46** -0.44** -0.29 -0.35 -0.33 -0.084
-0.22 -0.22 -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 -0.24
Collateral Dummy for:
   Land or Building 0.33 0.35 0.74**
-0.31 -0.32 -0.35
  Equipment -0.3 -0.3 -0.26
-0.44 -0.45 -0.48
  Accounts Receivable 1.37* 1.43* 1.52**
-0.8 -0.81 -0.72
  Personal Assets -0.43 -0.43 -0.33
-0.55 -0.57 -0.51
 Other Collateral 0.79 0.87 0.45
-0.55 -0.56 -0.57
Number of Firms 1486 1476 1476 1270 1262 1262
Adjusted R-squared 0.523 0.523 0.546 0.519 0.518 0.547
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No No Yes No
Country-Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: the  currency mismatch dummy is equal to 1 if last loan is denominated in foreign currency and  0 if last loan is denominated in domestic currency.  
Small Firms are firms with less than 100 employees.  Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported. 
Table A.4 Loan Maturity and Currency Mismatch
Dependant Variable Maturity in Months on Last Loan Reported in 2005 BEEPS Survey
Sample Small Firms in Non-Tradables Sectors (Restricted)
Estimation OLS
Currency Mismatch Dummy 9.93*** 9.93*** 8.96** 8.40** 8.40** 8.21*
-3.53 -3.5 -3.73 -3.74 -3.72 -4.2
Log of Sales  (2004) -0.18 0.46 0.18 -0.53 0.041 0.033
-1.04 -1.06 -1.22 -1.23 -1.27 -1.55
Log of Years in Operation -3.65** -3.71** -3.26* -4.08* -3.83* -3.57
-1.83 -1.85 -1.86 -2.28 -2.3 -2.49
Collateral Dummy for:
   Land or Building 2.25 2.49 2.67
-3.72 -3.74 -4.16
  Equipment 11.7*** 11.8*** 8.98**
-3.32 -3.37 -3.81
  Accounts Receivable 8.1 7.41 7.22
-5.84 -5.99 -6.82
  Personal Assets 6.53* 6.47* 5.56
-3.43 -3.4 -3.63
 Other Collateral 10.6** 9.61** 5.55
-4.76 -4.68 -5.54
Number of Firms 782 781 781 659 658 658
Adjusted R-squared 0.112 0.12 0.135 0.106 0.115 0.113
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No No Yes No
Country-Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: the  currency mismatch dummy is equal to 1 if last loan is denominated in foreign currency and  0 if last loan is denominated in domestic currency.  
Small Firms are firms with less than 100 employees.  The sample is of small firms in non-tradables sector is further restricted to privately-held firms, non-
listed on the stock market and with no exports. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported. 
Table A.5.  Loan Maturity and Currency Mismatch
Dependant Variable Maturity in Months on Last Loan Reported in 2005 BEEPS Survey
Sample Small Firms with No Exports
Estimation OLS
Currency Mismatch Dummy 12.8*** 12.9*** 12.9*** 12.4*** 12.3*** 12.8***
-2.44 -2.47 -2.55 -2.67 -2.69 -2.86
Log of Sales  (2004) 0.54 0.99 0.83 0.2 0.61 0.6
-0.63 -0.64 -0.72 -0.75 -0.76 -0.88
Log of Years in Operation -2.24* -2.36* -1.94 -2.50* -2.52* -2.03
-1.22 -1.22 -1.25 -1.42 -1.41 -1.5
Collateral Dummy for:
   Land or Building 1.48 1.56 2.33
-2.35 -2.39 -2.67
  Equipment 7.64*** 7.88*** 6.64***
-2.38 -2.37 -2.5
  Accounts Receivable 10.2** 9.82** 9.72**
-4.13 -4.25 -4.52
  Personal Assets 2.98 2.79 2.53
-2.56 -2.63 -2.76
 Other Collateral 9.24*** 8.70** 5.08
-3.49 -3.49 -3.93
Number of Firms 1486 1476 1476 1270 1262 1262
Adjusted R-squared 0.523 0.523 0.546 0.519 0.518 0.547
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No No Yes No
Country-Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: the  currency mismatch dummy is equal to 1 if last loan is denominated in foreign currency and  0 if last loan is denominated in domestic currency.  
Small Firms are firms with less than 100 employees.  Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported. 
Table A.6.  Growth in Sales and Currency Mismatch
Dependant Variable Growth in  Sales between 2001 and 2004
Sample Small Firms in Non-Tradables Sectors (Restricted)
Estimation OLS
Currency Mismatch Dummy 0.10*** 0.100*** 0.12*** 0.079** 0.078** 0.096**
-0.038 -0.037 -0.04 -0.037 -0.037 -0.041
Initial Log of Sales (2001) -0.050*** -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.027** -0.033** -0.030**
-0.011 -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.015
Log of Years in Operation -0.021 -0.019 0.0037 -0.041 -0.038 -0.012
-0.031 -0.032 -0.032 -0.032 -0.033 -0.034
Initial Labor Productivity -0.059*** -0.052** -0.054**
 Log(Sales/Employement) in 2001 -0.02 -0.022 -0.024
Share of Foreign Input in Production 0.0012*** 0.0013*** 0.0012**
-0.00046 -0.00048 -0.00052
Share of Employees with a University Degree 0.0015*** 0.0015** 0.0014**
-0.00055 -0.00058 -0.00064
Share of Skilled Workers 0.063 0.062 0.023
-0.05 -0.053 -0.056
Number of Firms 783 782 782 746 745 745
Adjusted R-squared 0.065 0.07 0.112 0.092 0.093 0.126
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No No Yes No
Country-Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes:  growth in sales is defined as log difference in sales between 2004 and 2001. Notes: the  currency mismatch dummy is equal to 1 if last loan is denominated 
in foreign currency and  0 if last loan is denominated in domestic currency.  Small Firms are firms with less than 100 employees.  The sample is of small firms in 
non-tradables sector is further restricted to privately-held firms, non-listed on the stock market and with no exports. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are 
reported. 
Table A.7.  Growth in Sales and Currency Mismatch
Dependant Variable Growth in  Sales between 2001 and 2004
Sample Small Firms with No Exports
Estimation OLS
Currency Mismatch Dummy 0.051* 0.050* 0.050* 0.029 0.029 0.032
-0.026 -0.026 -0.027 -0.026 -0.027 -0.028
Initial Log of Sales (2001) -0.046*** -0.048*** -0.046*** -0.027*** -0.030*** -0.026**
-0.0094 -0.0098 -0.011 -0.0099 -0.0099 -0.01
Log of Years in Operation -0.021 -0.017 -0.014 -0.043** -0.040** -0.037*
-0.019 -0.02 -0.019 -0.019 -0.02 -0.02
Initial Labor Productivity -0.048*** -0.047*** -0.049***
 Log(Sales/Employement) in 2001 -0.015 -0.016 -0.018
Share of Foreign Input in Production 0.00098*** 0.0011*** 0.00095***
-0.0003 -0.00031 -0.00032
Share of Employees with a University Degree 0.0008 0.00054 0.00045
-0.00051 -0.00057 -0.00062
Share of Skilled Workers 0.028 0.035 0.023
-0.037 -0.039 -0.04
Number of Firms 1501 1491 1491 1443 1434 1434
Adjusted R-squared 0.052 0.054 0.083 0.069 0.071 0.093
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No No Yes No
Country-Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes:  growth in sales is defined as log difference in sales between 2004 and 2001.  the  currency mismatch dummy is equal to 1 if last loan is denominated in 
foreign currency and  0 if last loan is denominated in domestic currency.  Small Firms are firms with less than 100 employees.  Heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors are reported. 
Table A.8.  Loan Interest Rate, Maturity and Currency Mismatch. Robustness: Alternative Set of Control Variables
Dependant Variable Interest Rate on Last Loan Maturity on Last Loan
Sample Small Firms in Non-Tradables Sectors
Estimation OLS
Currency Mismatch Dummy -2.42*** -2.40*** -2.31*** 10.1*** 10.3*** 8.67***
-0.37 -0.38 -0.42 -3.04 -3.02 -3.3
Log of Sales  (2004) -0.27** -0.26** -0.32** 0.003 0.39 0.52
-0.13 -0.13 -0.14 -1.07 -1.11 -1.29
Log of Years in Operation -0.72*** -0.75*** -0.64** -2.7 -2.45 -3.09
-0.26 -0.26 -0.3 -2.13 -2.17 -2.4
Initial Labor Productivity -0.071 -0.14 -0.15 0.36 0.62 -0.38
 Log(Sales/Employement) in 2001 -0.18 -0.18 -0.2 -1.08 -1.14 -1.25
Share of Employees with a University Degree -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.0041 -0.0019 -0.027
-0.005 -0.0052 -0.0055 -0.035 -0.037 -0.038
Share of Skilled Workers -0.65 -0.66 -0.46 -1.53 -0.91 -1.61
-0.47 -0.48 -0.52 -3.51 -3.52 -3.72
Number of Firms 986 986 986 821 821 821
Adjusted R-squared 0.614 0.613 0.624 0.609 0.608 0.628
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No No Yes No
Country-Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: see Table 3.1 and Table 3.2
Country
Currency mismatch
Annual change in currency mismatch
External debt/GDP Change in external 
debt/GDP PPP per capita $ GDP
Real GDP growth
Argentina 27.2 4.1 78.8 -5.9 10678 2.7
Bosnia&Herzegovina 15.9 -1.0 43.8 33.8 5584 4.8
Brazil -1.4 0.4 27.3 -15.4 8358 2.7
Bulgaria -27.2 5.6 80.5 2.3 8564 4.2
China 5.3 -0.7 12.2 -5.5 3791 9.5
Costa Rica 13.9 -1.1 30.3 4.9 8413 4.7
Croatia 30.7 -0.8 66.9 46.0 14009 2.8
Czech Republic -24.4 -0.5 39.4 0.8 18964 2.9
Egypt -3.7 -2.9 29.1 -16.3 4636 5.3
Estonia 11.3 2.2 80.3 87.0 14453 4.6
Guatemala -16.5 1.1 31.9 11.9 4199 3.5
Hungary 9.1 0.7 78.1 75.2 15255 2.9
Indonesia 8.8 -0.1 65.2 -124.6 3039 3.2
Kazakhstan -13.4 -0.3 76.6 55.0 7659 6.9
Latvia 6.7 4.2 90.2 94.0 11525 4.6
Lithuania 10.2 1.5 52.4 41.7 12530 4.2
Mexico -2.2 0.8 24.1 -13.1 11886 2.3
Peru -8.9 -0.8 42.6 -21.8 6299 4.4
Philippines 19.4 0.9 65.1 -38.7 2778 4.0
Poland 0.7 -0.5 46.4 31.5 12966 4.0
Romania 33.9 0.8 38.2 38.2 8661 3.2
Russia 9.5 2.9 46.4 -33.6 10753 4.6
Serbia -2.8 4.1 76.8 8.0 7730 3.0
Thailand -4.2 1.3 45.4 -65.6 6284 2.8
Turkey 11.1 -2.2 43.4 9.9 10012 3.0
Ukraine -12.8 4.5 53.2 68.0 4973 3.8
Uruguay 53.0 -1.2 71.9 -1.4 9531 2.0
Venezuela -5.8 0.3 32.5 -26.2 9806 2.9
Vietnam 13.8 2.2 37.8 -15.4 1980 6.9
Source: see Data Appendix
Table B2. Descripive Statistics Firm-Level Data.
Sample: Firms with a Loan in 2005 Survey
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Internest Rate on Last Loan 0.14 0.07
Maturity of Last Loan (Months) 31.09 29.92
Growth in Sales (annualized) 0.04 0.12
Growth in Employement (annualized) 0.05 0.19
Years of Operation 17.07 19.37
Collateral Dummy : Building/Land 0.74 0.44
Collateral Dummy:  Equipment 0.90 0.29
Collateral Dummy: Accounts Receivable 0.97 0.18
Collateral Dummy: Assets 0.93 0.26
Collateral Dummy: Other 0.95 0.22
Share Foreign Input in Production 0.35 0.38
Share Employees with University Degree 0.25 0.26
Share Skilled Employees 0.51 0.29
Dummy Last Loan in Foreign Currency 0.25 0.43
Source: BEEPS Survey 2005, EBRD/World Bank
Table B.1. Descriptive statistics for country panel growth regressions, averages 1998-2009
